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“Games with a Purpose” are interactive games that users play because they are fun, with the added beneﬁt
that the outcome of play is useful work. The ESP game, developed by [von Ahn and Dabbish 2004], is an
example of such a game devised to label images on the web. Since labeling images is a hard problem for
computer vision algorithms and can be tedious and time-consuming for humans, the ESP game provides
humans with incentive to do useful work by being enjoyable to play. We present a simple game-theoretic
model of the ESP game and characterize the equilibrium behavior in our model. Our equilibrium analysis
supports the fact that users appear to coordinate on low effort words. We provide an alternate model of user
preferences, modeling a change that could be induced through a different scoring method, and show that
equilibrium behavior in this model coordinates on high effort words. We also give sufﬁcient conditions for
coordinating on high effort words to be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Our results suggest the possibility of
formal incentive design in achieving desirable system-wide outcomes for the purpose of human computation,
complementing existing considerations of robustness against cheating and human factors.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The paradigm of human computation considers the possibility that networks of people
can be leveraged in solving large-scale problems that are hard for computers to solve.
Showcased by the early success of “Games with a Purpose” [von Ahn 2006] (GWAP),
human computation provides an example of the broader agenda of “peer production,”
which seeks to design and understand the problem of promoting large-scale collabora-
tions of humans outside of the traditional framework of ﬁrms and price signals [Ben-
kler 2002]. Examples of other peer-production systems include Wikipedia, YouTube,
question-and-answer forums such as Yahoo! Answers and Naver Knowledge-iN, and
Taskcn, a popular Chinese crowdsourcing website.
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Work by von Ahn and others has shown the tremendous power that networks of hu-
mans possess to solve problems while playing computer games [von Ahn and Dabbish
2004; von Ahn et al. 2006c; von Ahn et al. 2006a; von Ahn et al. 2006b; Law and von
Ahn 2009; Hacker and von Ahn 2009]. The ESP game is an example of such human
computation; it is an interactive system that allows users to be paired to play games
that label images on the web [von Ahn and Dabbish 2004]. Users play the ESP game
because it is an enjoyable game to play, with the added side-effect that they are do-
ing useful work in the process. As of July 2008, at least 200,000 people have played
the ESP game, which has led to the collection of over 50 million labels [von Ahn and
Dabbish 2008]. Subsequent work to the ESP game has included Peekaboom [von Ahn
et al. 2006c], a GWAP for locating objects within an image, Phetch [von Ahn et al.
2006a], for gathering useful descriptions for images on the web, Verbosity [von Ahn
et al. 2006b], for gathering common sense facts, TagATune [Law and von Ahn 2009],
for gathering tags for music clips, and Matchin [Hacker and von Ahn 2009], for elic-
iting user preferences. Still in the spirit of human computation, [Kearns et al. 2006]
provide results from a number of behavioral experiments to see how fast distributed
networks of humans can solve various graph problems, such as graph coloring.
While there has been incredible progress in yielding successful applications of hu-
man computation, there is still little theory at present to guide design. For GWAP, it
seems appropriate to use game theory to better understand how to design incentives
in order to achieve system-wide goals. For example, it appears anecdotally that during
play of the ESP game, people coordinate on easy words and that the game is less effec-
tive in labeling less obvious, harder words. Google seemed to have noticed this behavior
and introduced different scores for different labels depending on the “descriptiveness”
of the label in their version of the ESP game, called the Google Image Labeler. How-
ever, [Weber et al. 2008], suggest that this differentiation is not strong enough, and
that the resulting labels still tend to have a high percentage of colors, synonyms or
generic words. [Ho et al. 2009] also notice that the set of labels determined from the
ESP game for an image are not very diverse, and develop a three-player version of the
ESP game that involves the addition of a “blocker” to type in words that the other two
players cannot use to match.
Coordination on generic, indescriptive words is a problem for certain applications of
the ESP game. One of the largest applications of the ESP game is obtaining labels for
image search. In this case, it is important to have images assigned to all labels that
could potentially be queried in a search engine. To this end, we seek to understand
the interaction between preference models and game outcomes. We propose a simple
model of the game in which players independently choose an effort level (low or high),
which dictates which portion from a universe of words they sample. If a player samples
low effort, she samples from the most frequent set of words in the universe, whereas
if a player samples high effort, she samples from the entire universe of words. Once
players have independently sampled a dictionary (or type), they decide in which order
to output their words.
We consider two different models of payoffs, namely match-early preferences and
rare-words preferences. Match-early preferences model the setting in which players
wish to complete as many rounds as possible and receive the same score irrespective
of the words on which they match. The match-early preferences model reﬂects the
current method of assigning scores to outcomes in the ESP game. We show that low ef-
fort is an ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for all distributions on word frequencies,
with players focusing attention on high-frequency words. More speciﬁcally, we show
that choosing low effort in conjunction with playing words in order of decreasing fre-
quency is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for all utility functions consistent with match-
early preferences and all distributions on word frequencies. For the second stage of the
ACM Journal Name, Vol. 9, No. 4, Article 39, Publication date: March 2010.A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the ESP Game 39:3
game, we show that playing words in order of decreasing frequency is a Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium for all distributions of word frequencies and all utility functions consistent
with match-early preferences. Moreover, we show that (decreasing, decreasing) is one
of the few second-stage strategy proﬁles with these properties, and we determine that
the set of strategy proﬁles that satisfy this property obey an “almost decreasing” prop-
erty. Conditioned on the second-stage strategy of playing words in order of decreasing
frequency, we show that playing low effort is an ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
and that playing low effort is an ordinal best response to playing high effort. These
results generalize to any number of effort levels.
The main results obtained in the match-early preferences model are:
THEOREM 1.1. The second-stage strategy proﬁle (s
#
1;s
#
2), where both players play
their words in order of decreasing frequency, is a strict ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilib-
rium for the second-stage ESP game for every distribution over the universe of words
U and every choice of effort levels e1, e2. Moreover, the set of almost decreasing strategy
proﬁles are the only strategy proﬁles, in which at least one player plays a consistent
strategy, that can be an ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for every distribution over
U and every choice of effort levels e1, e2.
THEOREM 1.2. The complete game strategy proﬁle ((L;s
#
1);(L;s
#
2)), where both play-
ers exert low effort and play their words in order of decreasing frequency, is a strict
ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the complete ESP game under match-early pref-
erences, for every distribution over the universe of words U, except the uniform distri-
bution. Moreover, (L;s
#
1) is a strict ordinal best-response to (H;s
#
2) for every distribution
over U, except the uniform distribution.
In order to remedy the problem of users coordinating on common words, which occurs
when players adopt low effort and decreasing frequency strategies, we turn to the rare-
words preferences model. This is a model in which players wish to match on infrequent
words before frequent words, we suppose because of appropriately designed incentives,
and where the speed with which a match is achieved is no longer a consideration.
We show that under this preference model, there is a signiﬁcant difference in the
equilibrium structure, in that playing words in order of decreasing frequency is now
a strictly dominated strategy and playing words in order of increasing frequency is
an ex-post Nash equilibrium. This promotes matching on lower frequency words, with
the frequency of the word matched upon, for the same pair of dictionaries, under the
(increasing, increasing) strategy proﬁle at least as low as the (decreasing, decreasing)
strategy proﬁle. Given additional structure on the utility model we identify an equilib-
rium behavior that shows a useful focusing on lower frequency words. We show that
high effort is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for Zipﬁan distributions over word frequen-
cies under certain classes of utility functions that satisfy rare-words ﬁrst preferences.
This class of utility functions satisﬁes an additive discount property, meaning that the
difference in value between successive outcomes is an additive constant. We focus on
Zipﬁan distributions since the distribution of words in the English language follows a
Zipﬁan distribution with exponent very close to 1.
The main results obtained in the rare-words preferences model are:
THEOREM 1.3. The second-stage strategy proﬁle (s
"
1;s
"
2), where players play their
words in order of increasing frequency, is a strict ex-post Nash equilibrium for the
second-stage of the ESP game for every distribution over the universe of words U and
every e1 = e2, under rare-words preferences.
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THEOREM 1.4. The complete game strategy proﬁle ((H;s
"
1);(H;s
"
2)), where players
exert high effort and play their words in order of increasing frequency, is a Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium of the complete ESP game for Zipﬁan distributions with exponent
at least 1, s  1, over the universe of words U and any additive utility function that
satisﬁes rare-words preferences and any multiplicative utility function that satisﬁes
rare-words preferences with the ratio of point values for successive words at least two,
or r  2.
Many of these results adopt a robust equilibrium concept, namely ordinal Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium notion, we look for Bayesian-Nash equilibria
that hold for all valuations satisfying a given-preference model. In many cases, our
results hold for any distribution over the universe of words U, e.g. Theorems 1, 2 and
3. It should be noted in this case, these results don’t require that player 1 and player
2 have the same distribution of words over the universe U; it is only required that the
total ordering of words in the universe U is the same.
The results in this paper provide a simple explanation for why coordinating on low
effort, generic words is reasonable to expect in the ESP game, and suggest an alterna-
tive incentive structure to obtain coordination on higher effort, more descriptive words.
More speciﬁcally, Theorem 1.4 shows that to achieve coordination on low frequency, de-
scriptive words, it sufﬁces to have a constant difference in points, i.e. additive utility
function, between each successive word in the relevant universe U of words for an im-
age. Still, the system designer does not know the set of words in the universe a priori.
One way to address this is to award points based on the current knowledge of the rel-
evant words, with the points modiﬁed later through a delayed reward system, given
reﬁned knowledge of the word universe through subsequent game play. The frequency
ordering within this image-relevant universe can just be the ordering in the English
language. Although this proposed scheme is adopting the universe as played by users,
itself endogeneous to outcomes of the game, it seems likely to provide a reasonable
implementation of our preference model.
1.1. Related Work
[Ho et al. 2007; Chang et al. 2007] develop a simple game called PhotoSlap, for de-
termining content of images, based on the popular card game Snap. These authors
provide a game-theoretic analysis for PhotoSlap and are able to establish that the de-
sired behavior from a system-wide perspective is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
To our knowledge, [Ho et al. 2007; Chang et al. 2007] is the ﬁrst application of game
theory to human computation, however their model and analysis are speciﬁc to their
game and cannot be applied to the ESP game. Our model of the ESP game requires a
more intricate analysis, due to the fact that we model it as a game of imperfect infor-
mation rather than a game of perfect information, and the action space for our ESP
game model is much larger than the action space for the PhotoSlap model.
[von Ahn and Dabbish 2008] provide a classiﬁcation of games with a purpose: output-
agreement games, such as the ESP game, inversion-problem games, such as Peeka-
boom, and input-agreement games, such as TagATune. They provide the key elements
of each class in order to ensure the intended computation is done and discuss gen-
eral design paradigms for increasing enjoyment and output quality. [Ho and Chen
2009] study the veriﬁcation mechanisms used in various GWAP and classify the veri-
ﬁcation mechanisms into two classes, the sequential veriﬁcation mechanism (as used
in inversion-problem and input-agreement games) and the simultaneous veriﬁcation
mechanism (as used in output-agreement games), and model games that use these ver-
iﬁcation mechanisms. These authors model the simultaneous veriﬁcation mechanism
(as in ESP) as a one-shot symmetric coordination game for a report of a single word,
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and need to appeal to a focal point argument to explain why players will coordinate on
the most frequent word. [Ho and Chen 2009] also model a sequential veriﬁcation game
as an extensive form game of imperfect information and show that desirable system
wide outcome is supported in an equilibrium.
In an experimental study of the data generated from the Google Image Labeler,
[Weber et al. 2008] show that the set of tags for a given image are generated from a low
entropy distribution, and that labels entered by players are highly predictable given
Taboo Words. In establishing the second point, the authors test a bot programmed with
a simple language model learned from the Google Image Labeler, which infers what
label should come next solely from the set of Taboo Words already present and derives
no information from the image itself. They ﬁnd that this bot agrees with a human
player 81% of the time on images that have at least one Taboo Word. The analysis of
[Weber et al. 2008] suggests that players are tending to match on synonyms and colors.
For instance, they ﬁnd that 81% of images labeled “guy” also labeled “man” and over
10% of Taboo Words from approximately 14.5K images are colors. In order to remedy
this problem, these authors propose two alternate scoring schemes, such as rewarding
players for a label with value inversely proportional to the probability that this label
would be entered given the set of Taboo Words, and rewarding players based on the
amount of information gain from each new label, but do not provide a game-theoretic
analysis.
Game-theoretic models of other peer production systems have been proposed, in-
cluding a study of scoring mechanisms in Yahoo! Answers [Jain et al. 2009], all-pay
auction models of crowdsourcing systems (such as Taskcn and TopCoder) [DiPalatino
and Vojnovic 2009; Archak and Sundararajan 2009; Chawla et al. 2011; Cavallo and
Jain 2012] and related models in regard to the optimal design of contests [Moldovanu
and Sela 2001; 2006], and analysis of attention mechanisms in social computing sys-
tems [Ghosh and McAfee 2011; Ghosh and Hummel 2011]. In addition to this, a num-
ber of empirical studies of user behavior in various peer production systems show that
some fraction of users in these systems are behaving strategically [Yang et al. 2008;
Adamic et al. 2008; Nam et al. 2009], motivating the use of game theory to study such
systems.
2. THE ESP GAME
The ESP Game [von Ahn and Dabbish 2004] is a two-player game for labeling images
on the web. Labeling images has proven to be a hard problem for computer vision, yet
it is something that humans can do easily [Barnard et al. 2003]. However, in order
to label images, humans require some sort of incentive for this normally tedious task.
This is achieved in the ESP game by making the game fun to play.
In the ESP game, players are randomly paired and each player is presented with
the same image. Once the two players have entered a common word, this common
word becomes the label for the image. Players cannot communicate with each other
while they are entering words for the image and once they agree on a common word,
they only see the common word that they agreed upon. Players are paired for a set
of 15 images and each pair tries to label as many of the images as they can in 2.5
minutes. Players receive a ﬁxed number of points for each successful label. In the set
of 15 images, players get bonus points labeling ﬁve images, ten images, and ﬁfteen
images. Players can pass on difﬁcult images and they are revisited at the end of a
set. The only word that is used from the two input streams of an image is the ﬁrst
common word that is entered. It is intuitive that words upon which players will agree
are likely to be relevant to the image given that it is the image, and nothing else,
around which the players can coordinate. The game includes a scoreboard, with the
names of players with the highest scores, that is updated daily. Empirical studies of
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Fig. 1. Decision Tree For A Single Player: Players choose an effort level which dictates from which portion
of a universe of words they sample their dictionary. The process of sampling a dictionary can be thought of
as a move by nature. Finally, a player outputs a permutation on her dictionary.
other peer-production systems has shown that points are a key feature in motivating
users [Nam et al. 2009].
2.1. A Formal ESP Model
We model the ESP game as a two-stage game of imperfect information. In our model,
when a player decides to play the ESP game, she is presented with an image and
thinks up words to represent the image. She then makes a decision about how to enter
words depending how likely she is to match with the other player on those words. We
focus on modeling the game associated with one of the images in a set.
Let there be a universe of n words U = fw1;w2;:::;wng associated with the image
at hand and let 1 < d < n denote the dictionary size, or the number of words that
each player samples from the universe1. Each word in the universe has an associated
frequency, where fi denotes the frequency of word wi in the English language and Pn
i=1 fi = 1. Each player knows the frequency of the words sampled and can therefore
rank words according to frequency2.
Even though this is a game without any communication between players, it is useful
to decompose the strategy of a player into two components which we associated with
a ﬁrst stage, i.e. choosing an effort level, and a second stage, i.e. choosing a permuta-
tion on a sampled dictionary. We give a decision tree for a player in Figure 1. In the
ﬁrst stage, a player chooses an effort level: E = fL;Hg for low or high. The choice of
effort level determines the set of words in the universe from which a player samples
her dictionary. The sampled dictionary can be thought of as a move by nature. If a
player chooses L in the ﬁrst stage, the dictionary is sampled from the top n > nL > 0
words (without replacement). That is, word i in the top nL words is chosen ﬁrst with
probability fi;L =
fi PnL
j=1 fj. Let UL be the set of the highest nL frequency words in U,
or the “low universe”. In addition, let DL denote the set of all possible dictionaries a
player could obtain if she played L effort. If a player chooses effort H, the dictionary is
sampled from the top nH words, where nH = n, without replacement. In other words,
1Sometimes we use the additional assumption that d  n
2 .
2Additionally, assume that the words in the universe are ordered in terms of decreasing frequency, that is
f1  f2  :::  fn.
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the dictionary is sampled from the entire universe of words. That is word i in U is cho-
sen with probability fi;H = fi. Similarly, DH denotes the set of all possible dictionaries
a player could obtain if she played H effort. Note that we assume d < nL.
Given a word x 2 U, we let fe(x) represent the probability of sampling x given
that the player has chosen effort level e. This sample is modeled as a move by nature
and can be considered to be the point at which a player learns her “type”, namely her
dictionary of words. Both players are symmetric and each player has the same decision
space. Note that nL;nH, and d are parameters of the model.
In the second stage, once each player privately learns her dictionary based on the
effort level chosen, players choose a permutation on the words. This models the decision
in the ESP game about the order in which a player should enter words. This order on
a player’s dictionary deﬁnes the second-stage action of each player and determines the
outcome of the game. The outcome is deﬁned by the ﬁrst word that is in the ordered list
of both players and the location (where the location is deﬁned as the maximum value
of the two positions where the word occurs in each ordered list) at which that occurs.
Let D1 be the dictionary for player 1 and D2 be the dictionary for player 2. The sec-
ond stage strategy s1 2 S1 for player 1 deﬁnes a speciﬁc order s1(D1) on D1, for every
possible dictionary. Given an effort level, which induces a distribution on sampled dic-
tionaries, the second-stage strategy of a player deﬁnes a speciﬁc order in which words
are played, for every possible dictionary. Likewise, player 2 has a second-stage strategy
s2 2 S2 that deﬁnes an order on every possible dictionary.
A complete strategy for the ESP game is a pair i = (ei;si) 2 E  Si = i. This
deﬁnes the play in both stages, with the second-level strategy si deﬁning the order in
which words in the dictionary are played for all possible dictionaries sampled under
effort level ei. We focus on pure strategies, which exist in our game.
Deﬁnition 2.1. We deﬁne a match as follows: Suppose player 1 outputs a list of
words x1;x2;:::;xd and player 2 outputs a list of words y1;y2;:::;yd. If there exists 1 
i;j  d such that xi = yj, then there is a match in location max(i;j). The ﬁrst match is
the pair i;j that minimizes max(i;j) such that xi = yj.
Given this, an outcome is a pair o = (w;l) 2 (U [ )  (f1;:::;dg [ ) where (;)
indicates there was no match and the (w;l) pair otherwise indicates that the ﬁrst
match occurred on word w 2 U in location l 2 L, where L = f1;2;:::;dg [ . Let
O denote the set of possible outcomes. Let outcome function g(s1(D1);s2(D2)) 2 O
denote the outcome given s1, s2, D1, and D2, with the location (if any) of the ﬁrst
match is denoted gl(s1(D1);s2(D2)) 2 L and the word the ﬁrst match occurs is denoted
gw(s1(D1);s2(D2)) 2 U.
Each player i has a utility function vi : O ! <+ which induces a weak total prefer-
ence ordering on outcomes. We assume that both players have the same utility func-
tion. We consider two preference models: match-early preferences and rare-words pref-
erences. In both cases, we work with an ordinal model of preferences.
Deﬁnition 2.2. For match-early preferences, we require the following preference or-
dering on outcomes: (w1;l1)  (w2;l1)  :::  (wn;l1)  (w1;l2)  (w2;l2)  ::: 
(wn;l2)  :::  (w1;ld)  (w2;ld)  :::  (wn;ld)  (;) for all players.
Since players are indifferent between which word they match upon under match-early
preferences, we can simply describe the outcome of the match as a location, i.e. li can
be used to describe any element in the set f(w1;li);(w2;li);:::;(wn;li)g. We say that a
utility vi is consistent with match-early preferences if and only if vi(l1) > vi(l2) > ::: >
vi(ld) > vi(). This preference model captures the fact that players prefer to match
with their opponent as opposed to not matching, and players prefer to match in an
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earlier location rather than a later location. Players are agnostic as to which word is
matched and care only about location.
Deﬁnition 2.3. For rare-words preferences, we require the following preference or-
dering on outcomes:
(wn;l1)  (wn;l2)  :::  (wn;ln)  (wn 1;l1)  (wn 1;l2)  :::  (wn 1;ln)  ::: 
(w1;l1)  (w1;l2)  :::  (w1;ln)  (;).
Under rare-words preferences, players are indifferent between which location they
match and only care about which word they match upon. Therefore we can simply use
a word to denote the outcome, i.e. wi can be used to describe any element in the set
f(l1;wi);(l2;wi);:::;(ld;wi)g. We say that a utility function is consistent with rare-words
preferences if and only if vi(wn) > vi(wn 1) > ::: > vi(w1) > vi().
Let Pr(Dijei) denote the probability of dictionary Di given effort level ei. Often times
we write this as Pr(Di) and leave the effort level implicit. Given this, we now deﬁne
the probability of ﬁrst match in a particular location when player i knows her own type
but has only probabilistic information on the dictionary of the other player.
Deﬁnition 2.4. The probability of a match in location li, given s1(D1), s2, and a dis-
tribution on dictionaries Pr(D2), is p(li;s1(D1);s2) =
P
D2 Pr(D2)I(gl(s1(D1);s2(D2)) =
li).
Deﬁnition 2.5. The probability of a match on word wj, given s1(D1), s2, and a distri-
bution on dictionaries Pr(D2) is p(wj;s1(D1);s2) =
P
D2 Pr(D2)I(gw(s1(D1);s2(D2)) =
wj). p(li;s1(D1);s2) can be abbreviated as p(li) and p(wj;s1(D1);s2) as p(wj).
Let ui(si(Di);s i(D i)) = vi(g(s1(D1);s2(D2))) denote the utility to player i given re-
alized dictionaries D1 and D2. Let ui(si(Di);s i) =
P
D i Pr(D i)ui(si(Di);s i(D i))
denote the expected (interim) utility to player i given dictionary Di but with re-
spect to a distribution on the possible dictionary of the other player, as induced
by her effort level. Another way to express the expected interim utility to player
i given dictionary Di uses the probability of ﬁrst match vector deﬁned above:
ui(si(Di);s i) =
P
l2L p(l;si(Di);s i)  vi(l). It is also helpful to adopt ui(i; i) = P
D1
P
D2 Pr(D1je1)Pr(D2je2)ui(si(Di);s i(D i)) to denote the expected (ex-ante) util-
ity to player i before either dictionaries are sampled, given complete strategies  =
(1;2).
2.2. Equilibrium Framework
In analyzing the equilibrium of the ESP game, it will be helpful to isolate a restricted
game, or in other words, the game induced by a ﬁxed pair of ﬁrst stage strategies (i.e.,
efforts) of each player. For a complete strategy proﬁle (1;2) to be an equilibrium,
it is necessary that neither player can usefully deviate to an alternate second-stage
strategy. Of course this is not sufﬁcient to establish an equilibrium of the full game,
in that a player might still usefully deviate to an alternate effort in combination with
an alternate second stage strategy. To continue, consider the game induced by ﬁxing
effort levels (e1;e2) for the two players. This is a restricted game, that we refer to here
as the second stage game, which is conditioned on effort e1 and e2. In this second stage
game, each player knows her own dictionary but not the dictionary of the other player.
Given this, we can deﬁne some useful equilibrium concepts:
Deﬁnition 2.6. Second-stage strategy proﬁle s = (s
1;s
2) is an ex post Nash equi-
librium of the second stage of the ESP game conditioned on effort levels e1 and e2,
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if:
ui(s
i(Di);s
 i(D i))  ui(s0
i(Di);s
 i(D i)); 8Di;8s0
i 6= s
i; 8i 2 f1;2g (1)
This equilibrium is strict as long as there exists a pair of D1;D2 such that the above
inequality is strict.
We will adopt an analysis approach that establishes a strict ordinal Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium3, in the sense that we identify strategies that are an equilibrium for all
utility functions consistent with match-early preferences.
Deﬁnition 2.7. Strategy proﬁle s = (s
1;s
2) is a strict ordinal Bayesian-Nash equi-
librium of the second-stage of the ESP game conditioned on effort levels e1 and e2, if
for all ui consistent with match-early preferences,
ui(s
i(Di);s
 i) > ui(s0
i(Di);s
 i); 8Di;8s0
i 6= s
i; 8i 2 f1;2g (2)
where the probability adopted in interim utility ui for the distribution on the dictionary
of player  i is induced by the effort of that player in the ﬁrst stage.
There is an identical deﬁnition of ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for the second-
stage of the ESP game for rare-words preferences. We also deﬁne ordinal Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium for the entire game.
Deﬁnition 2.8. A strategy proﬁle  = (
1;
2) 2 12 is a strict ordinal Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium of the ESP game if for every ui consistent with match early prefer-
ences, we have
ui(
i ;
 i) > ui(0
i;
 i) 80
i 6= 
i ; 8i 2 f1;2g (3)
Likewise, there is an identical deﬁnition of ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for the
complete ESP game for rare-words preferences. Since the effort level chosen by each
player is not visible to the other player, there is no need for a subgame perfect reﬁne-
ment.
Next we deﬁne the notion of stochastic dominance for a general utility function. Our
deﬁnition uses the following notation: Suppose that u(si;s i) =
P
o2O Pr(ojsi;s i) 
vi(o) =
Pm
k=1 Pr(okjsi;s i)  vi(ok), for some ordering o1;o2;:::;om on outcomes.
We say that the strategies si and s i induce a probability vector on outcomes
(Pr(o1jsi;s i);Pr(o2jsi;s i);:::;Pr(omjsi;s i)).
Deﬁnition 2.9. Strategy si stochastically dominates s0
i with respect to opponent
strategy s i and outcome ordering o1;o2;:::;om if and only if
Pk
a=1 Pr(oajsi;s i) 
Pk
a=1 Pr(oajs0
i;s i) for all k. We say that the stochastic dominance property is strict
if there exists a k such that
Pk
a=1 Pr(oajsi;s i) >
Pk
a=1 Pr(oajs0
i;s i).
The following theorem equates our deﬁnition of stochastic dominance and ordinal
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. We omit the proof of the following theorem since it is a
standard proof in stochastic dominance [Hanoch and Levy 1969]. The literature on or-
dinal Bayesian incentive-compatibility for representation of committees, stable match-
ings, etc. likewise uses an analogous deﬁnition of stochastic dominance to establish
3It should be noted that typically, the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium concept is used in games of incomplete in-
formation rather than games of imperfect information. In this particular game, when considering Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium, the utility is computed in expectation over the distribution of choices by nature (i.e. dis-
tribution over all possible dictionaries). In incomplete information games, when considering Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium, the utility is computed in expectation over the distribution over agent types (i.e. distribution
over agent’s private valuation). In our model, agents’ valuations are assumed to be common knowledge, thus
our game is not an incomplete information game.
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that truth-telling is an ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium [d’Aspremont and Peleg
1988; Majumdar 2003].
THEOREM 2.10. Strategy si strictly stochastically dominates s0
i with respect to op-
ponent strategy s i if and only if ui(si;s i) > ui(s0
i;s i) for all vi consistent with the
preference ordering o1  o2  :::  om.
This means that we can use the stochastic dominance condition to establish ordinal
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for the second-stage of the ESP game and the complete
ESP game. We deﬁne stochastic dominance more speciﬁcally for the second-stage game
and the complete ESP game under each preference model as needed.
2.3. Remarks about the Model
We model the ESP game with each player sampling words from a universe of possible
words associated with the image, to which we associate a frequency ordering. Players
can vary the effort level that relates to how likely they are to sample frequent words
as opposed to infrequent words. Then players decide which order to play their sampled
words in the game.
We capture the idea that there are 15 images in a set, with a limited amount of
time, by considering match-early preferences. We do not model a sequential decision
making process, where users choose an effort level before sampling and entering each
successive word. We omit this because there seems to be little inference a player can
make about the strategy of the other player from the limited information revealed.
All a player learns is that no match has occurred. This provides little evidence, for
example, to discriminate between a player playing frequent words or a player playing
rare words. Rather it seems more likely that strategy updates occur after a successful
match, where a player learns what word provided the match. In addition, the time
frame per image is rather small; i.e., 2.5 minutes for 15 images. Thus it seems unlikely
that users are updating their strategy during the play on a particular image. It would
be interesting to empirically analyze the data from the ESP game to examine whether,
and if so when, strategy updates occur.
The universe of words for an image models the set of words that are in some way
relevant to the image, and represent the knowledge that the game designer is trying
to learn. Each of these words is relevant to the image at hand. For example, if we had
an image of a Victorian house and we had the two labels, “building” and “Victorian
house”, both are relevant, while one is more descriptive than the other [Weber et al.
2008].
The decision of a player is modeled with a “ﬁrst stage” choice of effort level and a “sec-
ond stage” choice of permutation on a sampled dictionary. Note that the use of “stage”
does not imply an observable action after the choice of effort level. What we refer to as
the “second stage” is merely an effort-constrained game, induced by a pair of effort lev-
els chosen by the players. We often use “second stage” and “effort-constrained game”
interchangeably. Given the equilibrium analysis in the effort-constrained game, we an-
alyze the complete game by ﬁxing the strategies determined in the effort-constrained
game analysis and examining the choice of effort level in the ﬁrst stage. We refer to
this analysis as the “complete game” analysis.
It should be noted that in many cases, the results in this paper generalize to any
number of effort levels, but we describe all the results using two effort levels for sim-
plicity. In order for the results to generalize to any number of effort levels, we need the
mappings in sections 3.2 and 4.2, to satisfy the following properties: 1) the lower effort
level’s universe needs to be a strict subset of the higher effort level’s universe; and 2)
the lower effort level’s universe needs to contain the highest frequency words of the
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higher effort level’s universe. We discuss the generalization of the results as they are
introduced in the paper.
Additionally, in many cases, only the total ordering of words in the universe U, and
not necessarily the exact frequency distribution, needs to be consistent across players.
Whenever a speciﬁc distribution is not imposed on U and the result is mentioned to
hold for any distribution over U, the result holds for the case that only the total or-
dering of words via frequency is the same. Finally, the model can be generalized to
handle the case where each player has a different universe of words. In such a case, a
player would have no reason to enter a word that is not in the other player’s universe.
Therefore, the results would hold for a universe of words that is the intersection of
both players sets of words.
In sampling words, it seems reasonable to model this sampling process for any given
image according to the distribution induced on the image-relevant universe by the fre-
quencies of words in the English language because there is cognitive effort required
to retrieve less frequently used words. Likewise, the English language is coded efﬁ-
ciently in that the more frequent, common words are generally shorter whereas the
less frequent, more descriptive words are generally longer (and thus take more effort
to type). We establish that low effort is an equilibrium under match-early preferences
even without associating a differential cost with a user’s effort, which would increase
with high effort and provide an increased preference towards low effort.
Match-early preferences model a player who prefers to match sooner rather than
later on an image, due to the time-constraint on all 15 images in the ESP game. The
actual implementation of the ESP game assigns the same number of points to players
if they match, regardless of where the match occurs (e.g. how many words they enter
before they match), and regardless of which word the match occurs. Despite this, play-
ers are under a time constraint and should prefer to match sooner rather than later,
in order to match on as many images as possible in the allotted amount of time. We
adopt an ordinal model of preferences, so that we do not have to quantify exactly how
much players prefer to match sooner rather than later. Rare-words preferences model
a player who prefers to match on rarer words than more frequent words, and is indif-
ferent between the location in which the match occurs, presumably because users will
be given more time for a set of images such that time is no longer such a key constraint.
We restrict our attention to strategies that involve playing all words in the dictionary
since any strategy that does not involve playing all words is weakly dominated by one
that involves playing all words. Moreover, we will look for equilibrium of the second-
stage of the ESP game in consistent strategies, which are strategies for a player that
do not change the relative ordering of elements depending on the player’s realized
dictionary. In other words, a consistent second-stage strategy involves specifying a
total ordering of elements on Ue (after choosing an effort level e) and applying that total
ordering to the realized dictionary. We do not restrict agents to only playing consistent
strategies, but rather identify equilibria in which a player does not wish to deviate
to an inconsistent strategy. A consistent strategy s speciﬁes a total ordering on the
set Ue: w0
1  w0
2  :::  w0
jUej, where w0
i is not necessarily the same as wi. In fact,
w0
i = wi for all i if and only if s = s#, where s# is the strategy in which a player
plays her words in order of decreasing frequency. Equilibria in consistent strategies
seem natural because of their simplicity, requiring that word x is played before word y
independent of whether any word z is present in a player’s dictionary.
3. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS UNDER MATCH-EARLY PREFERENCES
In this section, we analyze the equilibrium behavior under match-early preferences.
We show that playing decreasing frequency in conjunction with low effort is an ordinal
ACM Journal Name, Vol. 9, No. 4, Article 39, Publication date: March 2010.39:12 S. Jain and D. C. Parkes
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for the ESP game. All omitted proofs can be found in the
Appendix.
3.1. Equilibrium Analysis of the Effort-Constrained Game
First we see that playing words in order of decreasing frequency is not an ex-post Nash
equilibrium for the second stage game.
PROPOSITION 3.1. Suppose e = min(e1;e2) and Ue = fw1;w2;w3g, and d = 2. The
second-stage strategy proﬁle s = (s
#
1;s
#
2) is not an ex-post Nash equilibrium.
PROOF. Suppose D2 = fw2;w3g and D1 = fw1;w2g, s2(D2) dictates player 2 will
play w2 followed by w3. If player 1 deviates from s1 and plays w2 followed by w1, then
player 1 will get higher utility.
Since playing words in order of decreasing frequency is not an ex-post Nash equilib-
rium, we focus instead on establishing ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium via stochas-
tic dominance. We deﬁne stochastic dominance for the ordering on outcomes under
match-early preferences.
Deﬁnition 3.2. Fixing effort levels e1 and e2, ﬁxing the opponent’s second-stage
strategy s2, and ﬁxing dictionary D1, we say that the second-level ordering s1(D1)
stochastically dominates the second-level ordering s0
1(D1) with respect to match-early
preferences if and only if
Pk
a=1 p(la;s1(D1);s2) 
Pk
a=1 p(la;s0
1(D1);s2) for every 1 
k  d. We say that the stochastic dominance property is strict if there exists a k such
that 1  k  d and
Pk
a=1 p(la;s1(D1);s2) >
Pk
a=1 p(la;s0
1(D1);s2).
Deﬁnition 3.2 gives the notion of stochastic dominance for an ordering s1(D1). We
say a second-level strategy s1 stochastically dominates another second level strategy
s0
1 if and only if s(D1) stochastically dominates s0
1(D1) for all D1 2 D1.
In what follows, we show that “playing decreasing frequency” is a strict ordinal
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the second-stage ESP game, for any pairs of effort lev-
els e1, e2 and for any distribution over U. Moreover, we show that this equilibrium
is one of the few ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium that holds for every distribution
over U. We obtain a characterization result and show that the set of strategy proﬁles
that are ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the second-stage game satisfy an “al-
most decreasing” property. The crux of the argument will be to establish stochastic
dominance.
Algorithm 1 describes a possible strategy for player 1 in terms of player 2’s second-
level strategy s2. It takes as input any sampled dictionary D1, the distribution over U,
her opponent’s effort level e2, and the second-level strategy s2 of player 2 and outputs
an ordering on the words in D1. In order to get a completely speciﬁed strategy for
player 1 from Algorithm 1, we run the algorithm for all possible dictionaries D1 2 D1.
Algorithm 1 implicitly takes into account the effort level of player 2. If player 2 is
playing a lower effort level than player 1, player 1 will play those words in D1 \ Ue2
followed by any words in D1 that are not in Ue2 (these are the higher effort words that
player 2 did not sample). Likewise, if player 2 is playing a higher effort level than
player 1, this algorithm still computes a feasible output ordering for player 1. Since
the higher effort words that player 2 may have are not in her sampled dictionary, she
cannot play them.
We say that the output of Algorithm 1 with respect to dictionary D is in agreement
with s2 if for all pairs of words w0
i;w0
j 2 D, Algorithm 1 speciﬁes playing w0
i before w0
j
if and only if w0
i  w0
j in s2. Recall that we look for equilibrium in consistent strategies
and so s2 is associated with a well-deﬁned ordering.
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ALGORITHM 1: Candidate Best Response for Player 1
input : Sampled D1, 2 = (e2;s2)
maintain ordered list s1(D1) = ;
for i = 1 to d do
add element
Eadd = argmax
wj2D1 s1(D1)
X
D22De2
Pr(D2)  I(wj is in the top i of s2(D2))
to the end of the ordered list s1(D1)
end
output: s1(D1)
This algorithm does not always output an ordering that stochastically dominates all
other orderings in the sense of Deﬁnition 3.2. But, any time it fails to produce such an
output, we show that no such ordering exists.
The following deﬁnition is useful in characterizing the output of Algorithm 1. Note
that the set fw0
1;:::;w0
ng is ordered according to s2, i.e. s2 speciﬁes playing the following
total order on words: w0
1  w0
2  :::  w0
n. We also use the notation that w0
i 2 lk(s2(D2))
means that word w0
i is the kth highest priority word in dictionary D2, when s2 acts on
D2. Similarly, in the following deﬁnition w0
i 2 lk(s2(D2)) means that word w0
i is among
the k highest priority words of dictionary D2.
Deﬁnition 3.3. We say that second-stage strategy s2 satisﬁes the preservation con-
dition for a particular distribution, if for a ﬁxed effort level of player 2 and for ev-
ery pair of w0
i and w0
j such that i < j, we have that Pr(w0
i 2 lk(s2(D2))) > Pr(w0
j 2
lk(s2(D2))) for all max(1;i   n + d)  k  max(i;d   1).
Deﬁnition 3.4. We say that s2 satisﬁes the strong condition for a particular distri-
bution, if for a ﬁxed effort level of player 2 and for every pair of w0
i and w0
j such that
i < j  1, we have that Pr(w0
i 2 D2) > Pr(w0
j 2 lk(s2(D2))) for all max(2;i n+d+1) 
k  min(j   1;d   1).
In an almost decreasing strategy the ﬁrst n 1 words of s2 are sorted in order of the
decreasing frequency, but the last word may not necessarily be the least frequent word
of U. Therefore, there are a total of n strategies that satisfy this property. We use the
term, almost decreasing strategy proﬁle, to describe a symmetric strategy proﬁle (s;s),
where s is an almost decreasing strategy.
Deﬁnition 3.5. We say that a consistent strategy s2 satisﬁes the almost decreasing
property if and only if f(w0
i) > f(w0
j), for all 1  i < j  n   1.
LEMMA 3.6. If Algorithm 1 outputs an ordering that does not stochastically domi-
nate all other orderings, with respect to D1 and for ﬁxed opponent strategy 2, then no
such ordering exists.
PROOF. Let the output of Algorithm 1 be s(D1). Suppose there exists another or-
dering s0(D1) 6= s(D1) that stochastically dominates all other strategies. Let li be the
ﬁrst coordinate in which p(s(D1);s2) and p(s0(D1);s2) differ. It must be the case that
p(li;s(D1);s2)  p(li;s0(D1);s2) since Algorithm 1 will output the word (of the remain-
ing words) that will be the most likely to appear in the top i words of player 2. There-
fore,
Pi
a=1 p(la;s(D1);s2) 
Pi
a=1 p(la;s0(D1);s2).
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Recall from Theorem 2.10, that stochastic dominance, as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 3.2, is
a necessary condition in order to have utility maximization for all utilities consistent
with match early preferences.
The following lemma gives sufﬁcient conditions on the strategy of player 2 such that
Algorithm 1 will always output an ordering in agreement with s2, and such that this
strategy will stochastically dominate all other strategies.
LEMMA 3.7. If second-stage strategy s2 satisﬁes the preservation condition for a
particular distribution, then Algorithm 1 will always output an ordering in agreement
with s2, for any sampled dictionary. Moreover, if s2 satisﬁes the strong condition for this
distribution, then the strategy of always playing an ordering in agreement with s2 will
strictly stochastically dominate all other strategies, for any sampled dictionary.
PROOF. Since s2 satisﬁes the preservation condition, for every D1 = fw00
1;w00
2;:::;w00
dg
with w00
1  w00
2  :::  w00
d under s2, Pr(w00
i 2 lk(s2(D2))) > Pr(w00
j 2 lk(s2(D2))) for
all 1  k  i. Since Pr(w00
i 2 lk(s2(D2))) > Pr(w00
j 2 lk(s2(D2))) for all 1  k  i,
w00
j cannot be output before w00
i by Algorithm 1, for every D. Since this is true for all
w00
i ;w00
j 2 D with w00
i  w00
j , Algorithm 1 must output an ordering in agreement with
s2. The strong condition tells us that, for every D1, where D1 = fw00
1;w00
2;:::;w00
dg with
w00
1  w00
2  :::  w00
d under s2, Pr(w00
i 2 D) > Pr(w00
j 2 D(k)) for all i;j;k, with i < k < j.
Thus w00
1, w00
2, ..., w00
i are the set of words that strictly maximize
Pi
j=1 p(lj;s1(D1);s2) for
any i, and stochastic dominance is satisﬁed.
LEMMA 3.8. If a consistent strategy s2 satisﬁes the almost decreasing property, then
the strategy proﬁle (s2;s2) is a strict ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the second-
stage ESP game under match-early preferences, for every choice of effort levels e1 and
e2, for every distribution over U.
LEMMA 3.9. The symmetric strategy proﬁle (s2;s2) is a strict ordinal Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium of the second-stage ESP game under match-early preferences, for ev-
ery s2, for every e1 = e2, for the uniform distribution over U.
PROOF. Since the distribution over U is uniform, for all w0
i;w0
j with w0
i  w0
j in s2,
Pr(w0
i 2 D2) = Pr(w0
j 2 D2). This gives Pr(w0
i 2 D2 \ w0
j = 2 D2) = Pr(w0
j 2 D2 \ w0
i = 2 D2).
Likewise, under the uniform distribution, Pr(w0
i 2 lk(s2(D2)) \ w0
j = 2 lk(s2(D2))) >
Pr(w0
j 2 lk(s2(D2)) \ w0
i = 2 lk(s2(D2))) for all 1  k  i. Thus s2 satisﬁes the
preservation condition, for every s2. From Lemma 3.7, s2 is a best response to s2.
Finally, for every s2, Pr(w0
i 2 D) = Pr(w0
j 2 D), for all j;i such that j > i. Like-
wise, Pr(w0
j 2 D) > Pr(w0
j 2 lk(s2(D2))), for all j;k where j > k. This gives:
Pr(w0
i 2 D) = Pr(w0
j 2 D) > Pr(w0
j 2 lk(s2(D2)) for all i;j;k where i < k < j or
in other words, the strong condition is satisﬁed. Therefore Lemma 3.7, along with The-
orem 2.10, gives the desired result.
This lemma tells us that that strategy proﬁle (s0
1;s2), with s0
1 6= s2, cannot be an
ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium under the uniform distribution, because under the
uniform distribution over U, for every sampled dictionary, s2 generates a distribution
on outcomes that strictly stochastically dominates s0
1 6= s2. Therefore, for every utility
function consistent with match-early preferences, player 1 would prefer to deviate from
s0
1 to s2. Therefore, if a strategy proﬁle is an ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for all
distributions over U, then it must be that case that the strategy proﬁle is symmetric.
It should be noted that the statement of Lemma 3.9 can easily be generalized to take
care of the case where players play different effort levels, but still under the uniform
distribution over the words in U. If player 1 is playing a lower effort level than player 2,
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(s0
2;s2) is a strict Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for every s2, where s2 is a total ordering
on the set Ue2 and s0
2 is s2 with all the words in the set Ue2   Ue1 removed. Likewise, if
player 2 is playing a lower effort level than player 1, (s0
2;s2) is a strict Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium for every s2, where s2 is a total ordering on the set Ue2 and s0
2 is s2 with all
the words in the set Ue1   Ue2 concatenated to the end of s2, e.g. all words in Ue1   Ue2
are lower priority than all words in Ue2 under s0
2.
Lemma 3.10 tells us that for every symmetric strategy proﬁle (except for the almost
decreasing strategy proﬁles), there exists a distribution such that this strategy proﬁle
is not an ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Lemma 3.9 rules out the possibility of
an asymmetric strategy proﬁle as an ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium that holds
for every distribution over U and Lemma 3.10 rules out the possibility of a symmet-
ric strategy proﬁle (except for the almost decreasing strategy proﬁles) as an ordinal
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium that holds for every distribution over U. Therefore, Lem-
mas 3.9 and 3.10 can be used to establish Theorem 1.1, where it is shown that the
almost decreasing strategy proﬁles are the only strategy proﬁles that are an ordinal
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for every distribution over U.
LEMMA 3.10. For every (e2;s2) (except for s2 that are almost decreasing), there exists
a distribution over U, an effort level e1, and a dictionary for which Algorithm 1 will not
output an ordering in agreement with s2.
THEOREM 1.1. Second-stage strategy proﬁle (s
#
1;s
#
2) is a strict ordinal Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium for the second-stage ESP game for every distribution over U and
every choice of effort levels e1, e2. Moreover, the set of almost decreasing strategy proﬁles
are the only strategy proﬁles, in which at least one player plays a consistent strategy,
that can be an ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for every distribution over U and
every choice of effort levels e1, e2.
PROOF. Lemma 3.8 tells us that Algorithm 1 will always output a strategy in agree-
ment with s
#
2, if player 2 is playing s
#
2, regardless of D1 and the distribution over U.
Furthermore, this strategy stochastically dominates all other strategies, for every dis-
tribution over U. Lemma 3.9 tells us that there exists a distribution, namely the uni-
form distribution, for which Algorithm 1 will output an ordering in agreement with s2,
regardless of the dictionary D1, for all s2 that are consistent. Moreover, this strategy
will stochastically dominate all others, for the uniform distribution. Lemma 3.10 tells
us that there exists a distribution F(U) and dictionary D1 for which Algorithm 1 will
output an ordering that is not in agreement with s2, for all s2 that are not almost de-
creasing. Either this strategy stochastically dominates all others, for this distribution
F(U), or it does not. In the former case, we have exhibited two distributions that have
two different strategies that stochastically dominate all others. In the latter case, we
know that there is no strategy that stochastically dominates all others for the distri-
bution F(U) from Lemma 3.6. Therefore, there is no single strategy for player 1 that
stochastically dominates all others when player 2 is playing s2, where s2 is not al-
most decreasing, for all distributions over U and every utility function that satisﬁes
match-early preferences.
Deﬁnition 3.11. We say that the distribution on words in the universe satisﬁes a
Zipﬁan distribution if and only if f(wi) = 1
is for any s > 0.
LEMMA 3.12. If there exists an 1  i  n such that Pr(w0
i = 2 lj(s
"
2(D2)) \ w0
i+1 2
lj(s
"
2(D2))) > Pr(w0
i 2 lj(s
"
2(D2)) \ w0
i+1 = 2 lj(s
"
2(D2))) for some max(1;i   n + d) 
j  max(i;d   1), then (s
"
1;s
"
2) cannot be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for any utility
function satisfying match-early preferences.
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PROPOSITION 3.13. Second-stage strategy proﬁle (s
"
1;s
"
2) cannot be a Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium for the second-stage of the ESP game for any Zipﬁan distribution
over U with s  1 and for any utility function satisfying match-early preferences.
3.2. Equilibrium Analysis of the Complete Game
In the results that follow, we show that playing L at the top-level together with playing
words in order of decreasing frequency is a strict ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
for all distributions except the uniform distribution over U. For the case of the uniform
distribution, ((L;s
#
1);(L;s
#
2)) is a weak ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. In order
to show this, we ﬁrst carefully specify what it means for a strategy to stochastically
dominate another for the top level of the game, which ﬁxes the equilibrium strategy
for the bottom-level. This deﬁnition uses the following notation for a k-truncation of
dictionary D: D(k) is the set of k highest frequency words in D.
Deﬁnition 3.14. Fixing player 2’s strategy (e2;s2), we say that strategy (e1;s1) for
player 1 stochastically dominates strategy (e0
1;s1) for player 1, with respect to the out-
come ordering of match-early preferences, if and only if:
X
D1;e1
Pr(D1;e1je1)
X
D2;e2
Pr(D2;e2je2)I(gl(s1(D1;e1)(k);s2(D2;e2)(k)) 2 fl1;:::;lkg) 
X
D1;e0
1
Pr(D1;e0
1je0
1)
X
D2;e2
Pr(D2;e2je2)I(gl(s1(D1;e0
1)(k);s2(D2;e2)(k)) 2 fl1;:::;lkg) 8k
where gl(s1(D1;e1)(k);s2(D2;e2)(k)) gives the outcome when second-stage strategies s1
and s2 act on truncated dictionaries D1;e1(k) and D2;e2(k) and I() is the indicator func-
tion. We say the stochastic dominance is strict if there exists a k such that the above
inequality is strict.
Since Lemma 3.8 establishes that (s
#
1;s
#
2) is a strict ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilib-
rium of the second-stage ESP game, for all effort levels, we set (s1;s2) = (s
#
1;s
#
2) and we
know that I(gl(s1(D1;e1)(k);s2(D2;e2)(k)) 2 fl1;:::;lkg) = I(D1;e1(k)\D2;e2(k) 6= ;) since
the expression on the left hand side is simply the probability that a match occurs in
the ﬁrst k locations given that (s1;s2) = (s
#
1;s
#
2), which is exactly the probability that
player 1’s “top k” words overlap with player 2’s “top k” words.
In order to establish stochastic dominance, we construct a randomized mapping for
each dictionary that can be sampled when playing H to a number of dictionaries that
can be sampled when playing L. Each dictionary in DH is mapped to a dictionary
in DL that is at least as likely to match against the opponent’s dictionary, averaged
over the distribution of all possible dictionaries for the opponent. This is shown in
Lemma 3.16. In order to complete the proof, it is necessary to show that under the
randomized mapping, no element in DL is mapped to with greater probability under
the randomized mapping than under the original distribution over DL. This fact is
shown in Lemma 3.17.
We say that dictionary D0 with elements fw0
1;w0
2;:::;w0
ng (in order of decreasing fre-
quency) dominates dictionary D with elements fw1;w2;:::;wng (in order of decreasing
frequency) if f(w0
i)  f(wi) for all i. We say that the dominance is strict if D0 6= D. The
following lemma is needed to prove Lemma 3.16.
LEMMA 3.15. For every pair of dictionaries D0 and D such that dictionary D0 dom-
inates dictionary D, every effort level of player 2 and when both players play decreasing
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frequency in the second stage, we have that:
X
D2
Pr(D2)  I(D0(k) \ D2(k) 6= ;) 
X
D2
Pr(D2)  I(D(k) \ D2(k) 6= ;) 8k (4)
In addition, when D0 strictly dominates D, the inequality is strict for all k  k0, where
k0 is the ﬁrst coordinate where D0 and D differ.
PROOF. It sufﬁces to show equation 4 for D0 = fw0
1;w0
2;:::;w0
ng and D =
fw1;w2;:::;wng (both in sorted order) where wj = w0
j for all j 6= i and f(w0
i) > f(wi). If
k < i, equation 4 holds with equality. Consider k  i and let A = fw1;w2;:::;wkg fwig. P
D2 Pr(D2)I(D0(k)\D2(k) 6= ;) = Pr(D2(k)\A 6= ;)+Pr((D2(k)\A = ;)[(w0
i 2 D2(k))).
Likewise,
P
D2 Pr(D2)I(D(k) \ D2(k) 6= ;) = Pr(D2(k) \ A 6= ;) + Pr((D2(k) \ A =
;) [ (wi 2 D2(k))). We say D satisﬁes property P if D(k) \ A = ; and wi 2 D(k) and
property P0 if D(k)\A = ; and w0
i 2 D(k). It sufﬁces to show that Pr(D2 satisﬁes P0) >
Pr(D2 satisﬁes P). Consider the transformation t : Di ! D0
i, where Di is any dictionary
that satisﬁes P. If Di also has w0
i, t maps Di to Di and note Di satisﬁes property P0. If
Di does not have w0
i, t replaces wi with w0
i to yield dictionary D0
i. Since wi 2 Di(k), w0
i 2
D0
i(k). Likewise, since Di(k) \ A = ;, D0
i(k) \ A = ;. By Lemma A.1, Pr(D0
i) > Pr(Di).
Thus, we have established that: Pr(D2 satisﬁes P0) > Pr(D2 satisﬁes P).
For the following lemmas we use the randomized mapping h: Consider a dictionary
D 2 DH, D = A [ B, where A is the set of “low words” and B is the set of “high words”
(in other words, A = D \UL and B = D \(UH  UL)). Under our randomized mapping,
D is mapped to all dictionaries in DL 2 DL such that A  DL. In other words, D is
mapped to dictionary DL 2 DL with non-zero probability if and only if A  DL. If
A  DL, then D is mapped to DL with the same probability that you could would get
DL if you continued to sample individual words from UH (without replacement) until
you got d “low words”.
Note that if D contains only high words, D is mapped to all dictionaries in DL with
non-zero probability. Likewise, if D contains only low words, D is mapped to only one
dictionary in DL.
LEMMA 3.16. For every D1;H, where D1;H is a dictionary sampled with respect to
the H effort level, and for every h that satisﬁes the property that D1;H is mapped to a
dictionary in DL that contains the set D1;H \ UL and every effort level of player 2 and
when both players play decreasing frequency in the second stage, we have that:
X
D2
Pr(D2)  I(h(D1;H)(k) \ D2(k) 6= ;) 
X
D2
Pr(D2)  I(D1;H(k) \ D2(k) 6= ;) 8k and D1;H (5)
In addition, the inequality is strict for all k  k0 when h(D1;H) 6= D1;H and k0 is the ﬁrst
coordinate where h(D1;H) and D1;H differ.
PROOF. Due to Lemma 3.15, it sufﬁces to show h(D1;H) = fw0
1;w0
2;:::;w0
dg dominates
D1;H = fw1;w2;:::;wdg. Assume there exists a coordinate i with f(w0
i) < f(wi). Let j be
the minimum such coordinate. wj 2 UL since h(D1;H) contains words only in UL. This
means wj 2 h(D1;H). Since the dictionaries are in sorted order, this means wj = w0
k
for some k < j, however, this means h(D1;H) does not contain all of D1;H \ UL, a
contradiction. When h(D1;H) 6= D1;H, the dominance is strict.
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Lemma 3.17 states that the distribution obtained from sampling UL directly is the
same as the distribution obtained from sampling a high dictionary, followed by the
randomized mapping (i.e. sampling UH until you get d low words). The proof is easy
and omitted.
LEMMA 3.17. Pr(D1;LjL) =
P
D1;H Pr(D1;HjH)  Pr(h(D1;H) = D1;L)
Lemma 3.18 uses Lemmas 3.16 and 3.17 to show that playing L stochastically dom-
inates playing H under match-early preferences, assuming players play decreasing
frequency in the second stage. It is also important to note that this argument is inde-
pendent of the number of effort levels so the equilibrium analysis continues to hold as
we vary the number of effort levels, as long as there are at least two.
LEMMA 3.18. For every effort level of player 2 and when players play decreasing
frequency in the second stage:
X
D1;L
Pr(D1;LjL)
X
D2
Pr(D2)  I(D1;L(k) \ D2(k) 6= ;) >
X
D1;H
Pr(D1;HjH)
X
D2
Pr(D2)  I(D1;H(k) \ D2(k) 6= ;) 8k (6)
PROOF. From Lemma 3.17, we know that:
X
D1;L
Pr(D1;L)
X
D2
Pr(D2)  I(D1;L(k) \ D2(k) 6= ;) =
X
D1;L
[
X
D1;H
Pr(D1;HjH)Pr(h(D1;H) = D1;L)]
X
D2
Pr(D2)I(D1;L(k) \ D2(k) 6= ;) 8k
This is equivalent to writing:
X
D1;L
Pr(D1;L)
X
D2
Pr(D2)  I(D1;L(k) \ D2(k) 6= ;)
=
X
D1;L
[
X
D1;H
Pr(D1;HjH)Pr(h(D1;H) = D1;L)
X
D2
Pr(D2)I(h(D1;H)(k) \ D2(k) 6= ;)]
>
X
D1;L
[
X
D1;H
Pr(D1;HjH)Pr(h(D1;H) = D1;L)
X
D2
Pr(D2)I(D1;H(k) \ D2(k) 6= ;)]
=
X
D1;H
Pr(D1;HjH) 
X
D2
Pr(D2)  I(D1;H(k) \ D2(k) 6= ;) 8k
where the inequality follows from Lemma 3.16. We know that the inequality is strict
for all k since there exists a D1;H such that h(D1;H) 6= D1;H and h(D1;H) and D1;H
differ in the ﬁrst coordinate, for all possible values of h(D1;H) under the randomized
mapping.
Theorem 3.8 together with Lemma 3.18 and Theorem 2.10 gives us the following
result.
THEOREM 1.2. ((L;s
#
1);(L;s
#
2)) is a strict ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the
complete ESP game under match-early preferences, for every distribution over U, except
the uniform distribution. Moreover, (L;s
#
1) is a strict ordinal best-response to (H;s
#
2) for
every distribution over U, except the uniform distribution.
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COROLLARY 3.19. ((H;s
#
1);(H;s
#
2)) is not a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the com-
plete ESP game for any distribution over U, except the uniform distribution, and for
any utility function that satisﬁes match-early preferences.
These results can be generalized to a model with any number of effort levels. Con-
sider m effort levels, where m < n, these results would generalize as follows: Playing
the lowest effort level in conjunction with decreasing frequency, for both players, would
be a strict ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for any distribution over U and any
utility function satisfying match-early preferences. Moreover, playing the lowest effort
level in conjunction with decreasing frequency would be a strict ordinal best response
to playing any higher effort level with decreasing frequency, for any distribution over
U and any utility function satisfying match-early preferences. The randomized map-
ping that these results rely on can be generalized. Recall that the randomized mapping
maps each high dictionary to a set of low dictionaries that do at least as well in expecta-
tion against the opponent’s dictionary. The interpretation of the randomized mapping
is that each higher effort level dictionary is mapped to a lower effort level dictionary
with the probability that a player would get that low dictionary if continuing to sample
words until receiving d low words. This mapping will work as long as the lower effort
level’s universe is a strict subset of the higher effort level’s universe and the lower
effort level’s universe contains the highest frequency words of the higher effort level’s
universe.
4. THE EFFECT OF RARE-WORDS PREFERENCES
In this section, we consider the effect of rare-words preferences on the equilibrium
analysis. We look to understand whether there is a high effort equilibrium available
in this preference model, when players care about matching on rare words and are
indifferent between the location that they match.
For the second stage, we show that playing words in order of decreasing frequency
is strictly dominated, in stark contrast with the previous section. Also, playing words
in order of increasing frequency is an ex-post Nash equilibrium of the second-stage
game, for all pairs of effort levels chosen in the ﬁrst stage. Although, we show that
((H;s
"
1);(H;s
"
2)) cannot be an ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in the complete game
for any distribution over U, we show that for every distribution over U, there exists a
utility function for which ((H;s
"
1);(H;s
"
2)) is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. We also
show that ((L;s
"
1);(L;s
"
2)) is an ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for every distribu-
tion over U and this leads to a better outcome from the system designer’s perspec-
tive for every pair of player dictionaries. Finally, we demonstrate sufﬁcient conditions
on the utility function for Zipﬁan distributions in order for ((H;s
"
1);(H;s
"
2)) to be a
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium under rare-words preferences.
4.1. Equilibrium Analysis of the Effort-Constrained Game
We show that in this model, playing words in order of increasing frequency is not a
dominant strategy equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 4.1. Second-stage strategy proﬁle s
1 is a dominant strategy of the second
stage of the ESP game conditioned on effort levels e1 and e2, if:
u1(s
1(D1);s2(D2))  u1(s0
1(D1);s2(D2)); 8D1;D2;s2 and s0
1 6= s
1 (7)
Deﬁnition 4.2. Second-stage strategy proﬁle s1 is a dominated strategy of the sec-
ond stage of the ESP game conditioned on effort levels e1 and e2, if there exists an s0
1
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such that:
u1(s0
1(D1);s2(D2))  u1(s1(D1);s2(D2)); 8D1;D2;s2 (8)
We say that s1 is strictly dominated if there also exists a D1, D2 and s2 such that the
above inequality is strict.
PROPOSITION 4.3. Suppose that e = min(e1;e2), there are ﬁve words in the universe
Ue, fw1;w2;w3;w4;w5g, and d = 4. The second stage strategy proﬁle s = (s
"
1;s
"
2) is not
a dominant strategy equilibrium in the second-stage game for any distribution over U
under rare-words preferences.
PROOF. Suppose D2 = fw1;w2;w4;w5g, s2(D2) ! w4  w2  w5  w1, and D1 =
fw1;w3;w4;w5g. If s1 = s
"
1, the match will occur on w4. However, if s1 ! w5  w3 
w1  w4, the match will occur on w5, a strictly better outcome.
While playing words in order of increasing frequency is not a dominant strategy
equilibrium of the second-stage game, it is an ex-post Nash equilibrium with rare-
words preferences.
THEOREM 1.3. Second-stage strategy proﬁle (s
"
1;s
"
2) is a strict ex-post Nash equi-
librium for the second-stage of the ESP game for every distribution over U and every
e1 = e2, under rare-words preferences.
The statement of the above theorem can be generalized to handle the case where
players are playing different effort levels. In the case that player 1 is playing a higher
effort level than player 2, player 1’s best response to is play increasing on the set
D1 \ Ue2, followed by the words in the set D1 \ (Ue1   Ue2) (in any order). Likewise,
in the case that player 2 is playing a higher effort level than player 1, player 2’s best
response is to play increasing on the set D2 \ Ue1 (in any order), followed by the words
in the set D2 \(Ue1  Ue2) (in any order). This “generalized” increasing strategy can be
shown to be an ex-post Nash equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 4.4. Second-stage strategy s
#
1 is strictly dominated for any second-
stage strategy of player 2 and for any distribution over U and any choice of effort levels
e1;e2, under rare-words preferences.
4.2. Equilibrium Analysis of the Complete Game
In order to analyze the top-level game, we deﬁne stochastic dominance under the order
on outcomes associated with rare-words preferences.
Deﬁnition 4.5. Fixing player 2’s strategy (e2;s2), we say that strategy (e1;s1) for
player 1 stochastically dominates strategy (e0
1;s1) for player 1 with respect to the or-
dering on outcomes given by rare-words preferences, if and only if:
X
D1;e1
Pr(D1;e1je1)
X
D2;e2
Pr(D2;e2je2)I(gw(s1(D1;e1);s2(D2;e2)) 2 fwn;:::;wn k+1g) 
X
D1;e0
1
Pr(D1;e0
1je0
1)
X
D2;e2
Pr(D2;e2je2)I(gw(s1(D1;e0
1);s2(D2;e2)) 2 fwn;:::;wn k+1g) 8k
In addition, we say the stochastic dominance is strict if there exists a k such that the
above inequality is strict.
The next two propositions give general results about strategies in the complete ESP
game and use the randomized mapping from the previous section to map each high
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dictionary to a low dictionary that does at least as well as it in expectation. A designer
will prefer this equilibrium to the ((L;s
#
1);(L;s
#
2)) equilibrium we found for match-early
preferences, since the ((L;s
"
1);(L;s
"
2)) equilibrium leads to matches on a “rarer” word.
We formalize this observation in Remark 4.7.
PROPOSITION 4.6. ((L;s
"
1);(L;s
"
2)) is a strict ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of
the complete ESP game for every distribution over U under rare-words preferences.
PROOF. We use the randomized mapping from section 3.2 to map each DH 2 DH to
a set of dictionaries in DL, such that DH is mapped to DL if and only if DH \UL  DL.
This allows us to apply Lemma A.3. Since there exists a DH 2 DH consisting only of
“high words”, the inequalities are strict for at least one pair of DH;DL, where DH is
mapped to DL under the randomized mapping. Using Lemma A.3 and Lemma 3.17,
an identical version of Lemma 3.18 exists and establishes stochastic dominance in this
new model of preferences.
It should be noted that the previous proposition can be generalized to handle the case
where there are more than two effort levels. In such a model, we would have exerting
the lowest effort level in conjunction with increasing frequency, for both players, as
a strict ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for every distribution over U under rare-
words preferences. We would not have this result for any effort level that is not the
lowest, since Proposition 6 would generalize to any effort level that is not the lowest.
The following remark establishes that the (s
"
1;s
"
2) strategy proﬁle leads to a match
on a “rarer” word than the (s
#
1;s
#
2) strategy proﬁle. Speciﬁcally, we observe that for
any pair of dictionaries D1 and D2, the (s
"
1;s
"
2) strategy proﬁle yields an outcome at
least as good as the (s
#
1;s
#
2) strategy proﬁle from the system designer’s perspective.
In particular, when D1 and D2 overlap with more than one word, the (s
"
1;s
"
2) strategy
proﬁle yields the outcome of matching on the lowest frequency word and the (s
#
1;s
#
2)
strategy proﬁle yields the outcome of matching on highest frequency word. When D1
and D2 overlap with only one word, or no words, then (s
"
1;s
"
2) and (s
#
1;s
#
2) lead to the
same outcome. The proof is easy and omitted.
Remark 4.7. For any pair of dictionaries D1 2 De1, D2 2 De2, the (s
"
1;s
"
2) strategy
proﬁle yields a match on word with frequency at least as low as the (s
#
1;s
#
2) strategy
proﬁle.
The following proposition follows from the fact that if player 2 plays H, player 1
maximizes the probability of matching by playing L, yet maximizes the probability of
matching on the “rarest” word by playing H.
PROPOSITION 4.8. ((H;s
"
1);(H;s
"
2)) is not an ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of
the complete ESP game for any distribution over U under rare-words preferences.
PROOF. We show that the inequality in Deﬁnition 4.5 does not hold for k = n when
(e2;s2) = (H;s
"
2) and (e1;s1) = (H;s
"
1). Note that
P
D2 Pr(D2)  I(D \ D2 6= ;) =
P
D2 Pr(D2)  I(gw(s
"
1(D);s
"
2(D2)) 2 fwn;:::;w1g). Thus showing that the inequality in
Deﬁnition 4.5 does not hold for k = n when (e2;s2) = (H;s
"
2) and (e1;s1) = (H;s
"
1)
is equivalent to showing that Deﬁnition 3.14 does not hold for k = d when (e2;s2) =
(H;s
#
2) and (e1;s1) = (H;s
#
1), which is established by Lemma 3.18.
The previous proposition can be generalized to handle the case where there are more
than two effort levels. In such a model, we would have that for any effort level ei that
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is not the lowest, playing ei in conjunction with increasing frequency is not an ordinal
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for any distribution over U under rare-words preferences.
The implication of the above proposition is that for every distribution over U, there
exists a utility function for which (H;s
"
1) is not a best response to (H;s
"
2). Since
((H;s
"
1);(H;s
"
2)) cannot be an ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for any distribution
over U, we seek to understand under what conditions on utility functions and distribu-
tions we can get ((H;s
"
1);(H;s
"
2)) as a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. We restrict attention
to the Zipﬁan distribution over U and multiplicative and additive valuation functions.
Deﬁnition 4.9. Let i denote the ratio of successive outcome in the utility function
v(o) (satisfying rare-words preferences) with total ordering of outcomes o1  o2  ::: 
om. That is, let i =
v(oi)
v(oi+1).
In order to prove positive results for the top level of the game under this new prefer-
ence model, we use similar techniques as the previous section. In particular, we use a
“randomized mapping”, except in this case, we think of mapping each dictionary in DL
to a subset of dictionaries in DH. Rather than explicitly deﬁning a mapping and pro-
viding an intuitive explanation for the mapping as we did in the previous section, we
show that a valid mapping exists. In order to show that a valid mapping exists, we ﬁrst
deﬁne a linear system of equations that a mapping must satisfy in order to be valid.
We then prove that a solution to the system of equations exists, by deﬁning a second
system of equations. The second system of equations corresponds to the linear system
of equations that a mapping from the previous section must satisfy in order to be valid.
We show that a solution exists to this second system of equations (Lemma 4.10) and
that if a solution to the second system of equations exists, then a solution to the ﬁrst
system of equations exists (Lemma 4.11).
We start by deﬁning a linear system of equations that a mapping must satisfy in
order to be valid. Consider a mapping that maps each DL 2 DL to some subset of
dictionaries in DH. Suppose the dictionaries in DL are indexed via i = 1;:::;jDLj and
the dictionaries in DH are indexed via j = 1;:::;jDHj. Let the variable xij denote the
probability that Di
L is mapped to D
j
H. Note that xij = 0 if and only if D
j
H \ UL * Di
L.
Therefore, we know that each Di
L is mapped to
 jUHj jULj+d
d

. A valid mapping must
satisfy the following properties:
(1)
PjDHj
j=1 xij = 1 8i such that 1  i  jDLj
(2)
PjDLj
i=1 Pr(Di
L)  xij = Pr(D
j
H) 8j such that 1  j  jDHj
In order for the mapping to be valid, it must also be the case that 0  xij  1 for all
i;j. Note that in the above system of the equations, some of the xij are removed so that
they will always be set to 0. A variable xij is removed from the above set of equations
if and only if D
j
H \ UL * Di
L.
In order to show that a solution to the above system of linear equations exists, we
give a second system of linear equations. This system of equations is exactly the set of
equations that the mapping from the previous section needed to satisfy in order to be
a valid mapping.
(1)
PjDLj
i=1 yij = 1 8j such that 1  j  jDHj
(2)
PjDHj
j=1 Pr(D
j
H)  yij = Pr(Di
L) 8i such that 1  i  jDLj
Similar to the previous system of linear equations, it must also be the case that
0  yij  1 for all i;j, and some of the yij are removed so that they will always be set to
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0. A variable yij is removed from the above set of equations if and only if D
j
H\UL * Di
L.
The following two lemmas are proved in the Appendix and show that a solution exists
to the ﬁrst set of equations. Therefore, we know that a valid mapping exists from DH
to DL with the desired properties.
LEMMA 4.10. There exists a solution to the second system of linear equations.
LEMMA 4.11. If a solution to the second system of linear equations exists, then a so-
lution to the ﬁrst system of linear equations exists. Namely this solution can be obtained
by xij = yij 
Pr(D
j
HjH)
Pr(Di
LjL) .
Lemma 4.12 states that the distribution obtained from sampling UH directly is the
same as the distribution obtained from sampling a low dictionary, followed by the ran-
domized mapping. This follows immediately from the second set of conditions we re-
quire the randomized mapping to satisfy.
LEMMA 4.12. Pr(D1;HjH) =
P
D1;L Pr(D1;LjL)  Pr(g(D1;L) = D1;H)
We say that dictionary D0 with elements fw0
d;w0
d 1;:::;w0
1g (in order of increasing fre-
quency) dominates dictionary D with elements fwd;wd 1;:::;w1g (in order of increasing
frequency) if f(w0
i)  f(wi) for all i. We say that the dominance is strict if D0 6= D.
For the following lemmas, we use this randomized mapping, which satisﬁes the fol-
lowing property: Each DL 2 DL is mapped to all dictionaries in DH 2 DH such that
DH \ UL  DL. In other words, each DL 2 DL is mapped to dictionary DH 2 DH with
non-zero probability if and only if DH \ UL  DL. We show that if the randomized
mapping satisﬁes this property, it must be the case that each low dictionary is mapped
to a high dictionary that dominates it.
LEMMA 4.13. If DH  DH satisﬁes the property DH \ UL  DL for any DL 2 DL,
then each DH dominates DL. The dominance is strict when DH 6= DL.
PROOF. Let DL = fwd;wd 1;:::;w1g and let DH = fw0
d;w0
d 1;:::;w0
1g (sorted in order
of increasing frequency), where DH \ UL  DL. Assume DH does not dominate DL,
so there exists a coordinate i such that f(wi) < f(w0
i). Let i be the minimum such
coordinate. Since DL  UL, w0
i 2 UL, and so w0
i 2 DL. Since the dictionaries are in
sorted order, wj = w0
i for some j > i, however this means there exists a w0
k 2 DH \ UL,
where w0
k = 2 DL. Thus for all 1  i  d, f(wi)  f(w0
i). If DH 6= DL, there exists an i
such that wi 6= w0
i. Therefore, f(wi) > f(w0
i) and the dominance is strict.
LEMMA 4.14. For every D1;L, where D1;L is a dictionary sampled with respect to
the L effort level, and for every g that satisﬁes the property that D1;L is mapped to a
dictionary in D1;H 2 DH such that D1;H \ UL  D1;L and when both players play
increasing frequency in the second stage and for all utility functions that satisfy rare-
words preferences and k 
Pr(wn k2DH)
Pr(wn k+12DH) for all k, we have that:
X
D2;H
Pr(D2;H)  u(s
"
1(g(D1;L));s
"
2(D2;H)) 
X
D2;H
Pr(D2;H)  u(s
"
1(D1;L);s
"
2(D2;H)) 8D1;L (9)
In addition, the inequality is strict when g(D1;L) 6= D1;L.
Lemma 4.15 uses Lemmas 4.14 and 4.12 to show that playing H yields greater util-
ity than L, given that the other playing is playing H, assuming players play increasing
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frequency in the second stage. It is also important to note that this argument is inde-
pendent of the number of effort levels so the equilibrium analysis holds as we vary the
number of effort levels, as long as there are at least two.
LEMMA 4.15. Given that players are playing words in order of increasing frequency,
X
D1;H
Pr(D1;HjH)
X
D2;H
Pr(D2;HjH)  u(s
"
1(D1;H);s
"
2(D2;H)) >
X
D1;L
Pr(D1;LjL)
X
D2;H
Pr(D2;HjH)  u(s
"
1(D1;H);s
"
2(D2;H)) (10)
for all u that satisfy rare-words preferences and k 
Pr(wn k2DH)
Pr(wn k+12DH) for all k.
Theorem 1.3 together with Lemma 4.15 gives us the following result.
PROPOSITION 4.16. ((H;s
"
1);(H;s
"
2)) is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the ESP
game for all distributions over U and any utility function that satisﬁes rare-words pref-
erences and k 
Pr(wn k2DH)
Pr(wn k+12DH) for all k.
COROLLARY 4.17. For every distribution over U, there exists a utility function satis-
fying rare-words preferences for which ((H;s
"
1);(H;s
"
2)) is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
of the ESP game.
PROPOSITION 4.18. There exists a distribution over U for which ((H;s1);(H;s2))
cannot be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the ESP game for any pair of consistent
second-stage strategies s1;s2 and for any utility function satisfying match-early prefer-
ences.
We interpret the conditions on the utility function in Theorem 4.16 for a speciﬁc class
of distributions, namely the Zipﬁan distribution (see Deﬁnition 3.11). For this analy-
sis, we restrict attention to the case where s  1. Proposition 1.4 gives the criteria
for ((H;s
"
1);(H;s
"
2)) to be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for a family of Zipﬁan distri-
butions, when the dictionaries are sampled with replacement. We note that for large
values of n the conditions for when the dictionaries are sampled without replacement
are virtually identical to the case where the dictionaries are sampled with replace-
ment.
Deﬁnition 4.19. Additive Discount Property: Under rare-words preferences, a util-
ity function v(o) over the total ordering of outcomes o1  o2  :::  om satisﬁes the
additive discount property if and only if, for each pair of adjacent outcomes oj and
oj+1, v(oj)   v(oj+1) = c for some constant c > 0 and v(om) = 0.
Deﬁnition 4.20. Multiplicative Discount Property: Under rare-words preferences,
a utility function v(o) over the total ordering of outcomes o1  o2  :::  om satisﬁes
the multiplicative discount property if and only if, for each pair of adjacent outcomes
oj and oj+1,
v(oj)
v(oj+1)  r for some constant r > 1.
THEOREM 1.4. ((H;s
"
1);(H;s
"
2)) is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the complete ESP
game for Zipﬁan distributions over U with s  1 and any additive utility function that
satisﬁes rare-words preferences and any multiplicative utility function that satisﬁes
rare-words preferences with r  2.
PROOF. From Lemma 4.14, it sufﬁces to show t0
i  v(w0
i) > ti  v(wi). First consider
the case of additive utility functions. Assume that w0
i is the jth most frequent word
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in the universe and wi is the kth most frequent word in the universe (with j > k).
Under the Zipﬁan distribution, t0
i = 1   (1   1
jsZ)d and ti = 1   (1   1
ksZ)d, where
Z =
P
w2UM f(w)  
Pi+1
j=d f(wj). According to Lemma A.2 that ti
t0
i 
j
s
ks 
j
k. Since
ti
t0
i 
j
k, ti
t0
i 
jc
kc, which gives t0
i  v(w0
i) > ti  v(wi) for all additive utility functions.
Now consider the case of multiplicative utility functions. We have shown that ti
t0
i 
j
k.
Since
j
k  2
j
2k for all integers j > k, t0
i  v(w0
i) > ti  v(wi) for all multiplicative utility
functions with r  2.
It should be noted that Theorem 1.4 generalizes to hold for the many effort level
model. Namely, Theorem 1.4 will hold for any effort level that is not the lowest effort
level. For the lowest effort level, we have Proposition 5.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduced a simple model of the ESP game and provided, in many
cases, complete characterizations of the equilibria. We introduced a model of match-
early preferences to capture the current set-up of the ESP game. We showed that
the strategy proﬁle (s;s), where s is an almost decreasing strategy, is a strict ordinal
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the second-stage of the ESP game (under match-early
preferences) for every distribution over U, irrespective of the effort levels chosen in
the ﬁrst-stage. Moreover, we showed that these are the only strategy proﬁles, where
at least one player is playing a consistent strategy, that is a strict ordinal Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium for every distribution over U. These results hold even if players have
different distributions over U, as long as the total ordering of words in U in terms of
frequency is the same for both players. Since the (s
#
1;s
#
2) is the most natural of the set of
strategies that satisfy the almost decreasing property, we focused on this equilibrium
proﬁle when analyzing the equilibrium of the complete game.
The implication of equilibrium characterization for the second-stage ESP game un-
der match-early preferences is that there exists a distribution such that (s
"
1;s
"
2) cannot
be an ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. However, we can make a stronger claim,
that there exist distributions for which (s
"
1;s
"
2) cannot be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
for any valuation function satisfying match-early preferences. We showed that the Zip-
ﬁan distribution is one such distribution. The Zipﬁan distribution is signiﬁcant in this
setting since the distribution of words in the English language is known to follow a
Zipﬁan with exponent very close to 1 [Zipf 1932].
Given the equilibrium analysis for the second-stage, we showed that ((L;s
#
1);(L;s
#
2))
is a strict ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the complete ESP game, under match-
early preferences, for every distribution over U, except for the uniform distribution.
We precluded the existence of a ((H;s
#
1);(H;s
#
2)) equilibrium for any distribution over
U, except for the uniform distribution, and any utility function that satisﬁes match-
early preferences, by showing that (L;s
#
1) is a strict ordinal best response to (H;s
#
2).
In the case of the uniform distribution over U, we established both ((L;s
#
1);(L;s
#
2))
and ((H;s
#
1);(H;s
#
2)) are weak ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the complete ESP
game. While the model of the ESP game states that both users have the same utility
function, we note that in establishing ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, these strat-
egy proﬁles are in equilibrium for any utilities that satisfy match-early preferences.
Our equilibrium analysis supports existing empirical results that suggest that users
tend to coordinate on low effort words in the ESP game.
In order to model an alternative set-up for the ESP game in which users may choose
to coordinate on more difﬁcult words, we introduced the rare-words preferences model.
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We showed that (s
"
1;s
"
2) is a strict ex-post Nash equilibrium for the second-stage of
the ESP game under rare-words preferences and every distribution over U. There-
fore, we focused on the (s
"
1;s
"
2) strategy proﬁle when analyzing the complete game. We
also showed that the strategy s# is strictly dominated for the second-stage of the ESP
game under rare-words preferences and every distribution over U. This is in contrast
with the equilibrium analysis of the second-stage game under match-early preferences,
where (s
#
1;s
#
2) is one of only a few strategy proﬁles that are ordinal Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium for every distribution over U. We also showed that (s
"
1;s
"
2) is not an ordi-
nal Bayesian Nash equilibrium for every distribution over U and there exist distribu-
tions, including the Zipﬁan distribution, such that (s
"
1;s
"
2) cannot be a Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium for any valuation function consistent with match-early preferences.
We analyzed the complete ESP game under rare-words preferences. We found that
((L;s
"
1);(L;s
"
2)) is a strict ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for ever distribution over
U. Although low effort, this leads to a (weakly) better outcome than the strategy proﬁle
((L;s
#
1);(L;s
#
2)), which was the equilibrium under match-early preferences. Although
we show that high effort cannot be obtained in an ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium,
((H;s
"
1);(H;s
"
2)) can be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for every distribution over U for
certain conditions on the utility function. Since the distribution of words in the English
language is known to follow a Zipﬁan distribution with exponent very close to 1, we
interpreted these conditions for the Zipﬁan distribution by focusing attention on two
very natural classes of utility functions, additive utility functions and multiplicative
utility functions. Theorem 1.4 showed an interesting result in that, in order to have
coordination on low frequency, more descriptive words, it sufﬁces to have a constant
difference in points between each subsequent word in the universe. In implementing
this, we suggest a delayed reward scheme, where points are adjusted as the systems
reﬁnes its knowledge of the relevant universe of words. Though it is perhaps unsatis-
fying to not be able to award the full amount of points upon agreement, it is important
to note that the point total will only increase as the center learns more about the set
of words in the universe.
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A. APPENDIX
LEMMA 3.8. If a consistent strategy s2 satisﬁes the almost decreasing property, then
the strategy proﬁle (s2;s2) is a strict ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the second-
stage ESP game under match-early preferences, for every choice of effort levels e1 and
e2, for every distribution over U.
PROOF. For each w0
i;w0
j such that w0
i  w0
j under s2, where s2 is an almost decreasing
strategy, f(w0
i)  f(w0
j), as long as w0
j is not the least priority word under s2, for all dis-
tributions over U. Consider the set A of dictionaries that satisfy the property that w0
i 2
lk(s2(D2)) \ w0
j = 2 lk(s2(D2)) and the set B of dictionaries that satisfy the property
that w0
j 2 lk(s2(D2))\w0
i = 2 lk(s2(D2)), for any max(1;i n+d)  k  max(i;d 1). If w0
j
is the least priority word under s2, B = ; and A 6= ;, so Pr(D2 2 B) < Pr(D2 2 A). Now
suppose w0
j is not the least priority element under s2. Notice B is the exactly the set of
dictionaries that satisfy: w0
j 2 lk(s2(D2))\w0
i = 2 D2. There exists a mapping t : B ! A,
which takes a B 2 B to an A 2 A, by removing w0
j and replacing it with w0
i. The map-
ping t takes each element B 2 B to a unique element in A 2 A, where Pr(B) < Pr(A),
due to Lemma A.1. Therefore Pr(D2 2 B) < Pr(D2 2 A). Hence the preservation con-
dition is satisﬁed when s2 is an almost decreasing strategy, regardless of distribution.
Finally, when s2 is an almost decreasing strategy, Pr(w0
i 2 D2) > Pr(w0
j 2 D2), for all
j;i such that n > j > i. Likewise, Pr(w0
j 2 D2)  Pr(w0
j 2 lk(s2(D2)), for all j;k. Thus:
Pr(w0
i 2 D2) > Pr(w0
j 2 D2)  Pr(w0
j 2 lk(s2(D2))) for all i;j;k where i + 1 < j < n
and k  d   1 and for all distributions. When j = n, Pr(w0
n 2 lk(s2(D2)) = 0 for all
k  d   1, so Pr(w0
i 2 D2) > Pr(w0
n 2 lk(s2(D2)) for all i < n and k  d   1. Hence,
the strong condition is satisﬁed for all distributions over U. Lemma 3.7, along with
Theorem 2.10, gives the desired result.
LEMMA 3.10. For every (e2;s2) (except for s2 that are almost decreasing), there exists
a distribution over U, an effort level e1, and a dictionary for which Algorithm 1 will not
output an ordering in agreement with s2.
PROOF. Since s2 is not an almost decreasing strategy, there exists adjacent w0
i 
w0
i+1 under s2 such that f(w0
i) < f(w0
i+1) and i < n   1. Let i be the smallest such
index. Assume that w0
i+1 is the kth most frequent element in U. Consider the following
distribution over U: The top k most frequent words in U have frequency 1 
k and the n 
k least frequent words in U have frequency 
n k, where  <
(n 2d+1)(n k)
nk dk+(n k)(n 2d+1). (The
RHS > 0 since d  n
2.) Consider the following sets, A, B, C: Set A contains dictionaries
that have w0
i in the top j positions of s2(D2) (where max(1;i n+d)  j  max(i;d 1))
and do not contain w0
i+1. Set B contains dictionaries that have w0
i in the top j positions
of s2(D2) and also contain w0
i+1. Set C contains dictionaries that have have w0
i+1 in the
top i positions and do not contain w0
i. We construct t1 : A ! C and t2 : B ! C. t1 replaces
w0
i with w0
i+1. Since w0
i and w0
i+1 are adjacent in s2 and A and C are non-empty, t1 is a
bijection. From Lemma A.1, each A 2 A that occurs with probability pA is mapped to a
C 2 C that occurs with probability at least as high as pA 
f(wi+1)
f(wi) . There exists at least
one case such that this inequality is strict. Thus Pr(D2 2 C) >
f(wi+1)
f(wi)  Pr(D2 2 A).
Note that jBj =
 n 2
d 2

and jCj =
 n 2
d 1

. Since d  n
2,
 n 2
d 2

<
 n 2
d 1

, so jBj < jCj. Thus
there exists a t2 that takes each B 2 B to a unique C 2 C. t2 removes w0
i and replaces
it with an x 2 U   B. t2 maps a B 2 B that occurs with probability pB to a C 2 C that
occurs with probability pC  pB. Therefore,
Pr(D22B)
Pr(D22C)  (
n 2
d 2)
(
n 2
d 1). Combining this with
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Pr(D22A)
Pr(D22C) <
f(w
0
i)
f(w0
i+1 < n 2d+1
n d , Pr(D2 2 A) + Pr(D2 2 B) < Pr(D2 2 C). This implies
Pr(w0
i 2 lj(s2(D2))) < Pr(w0
i+1 2 lj(s2(D2))). Consider any D1 with w0
i as the jth
highest priority word under s2. Given the selection of i, the ﬁrst j 1 words of D1 are in
order of decreasing frequency. Therefore, Algorithm 1 will output the ﬁrst j   1 words
of D1 according to s2. At the jth step of the algorithm, since Pr(w0
i 2 lj(s2(D2))) <
Pr(w0
i+1 2 lj(s2(D2))), w0
i will not be output.
LEMMA 3.12. If there exists an 1  i  n such that Pr(w0
i = 2 lj(s
"
2(D2)) \ w0
i+1 2
lj(s
"
2(D2)))  Pr(w0
i 2 lj(s
"
2(D2)) \ w0
i+1 = 2 lj(s
"
2(D2))) for some max(1;i   n + d) 
j  max(i;d   1), then (";") cannot be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for any valuation
function satisfying match-early preferences.
PROOF. Suppose s1 = s
"
1 and s2 = s
"
2. Consider adjacent w0
i and w0
i+1 with f(w0
i) >
f(w0
i+1) and consider a D1 that contains w0
i and w0
i+1. We consider player 1’s utility of
playing s
"
1(D1) versus the utility of playing the same ordering yet swapping w0
i and
w0
i+1. Call the latter strategy s0
1. Assume that w0
i is the jth word of s
"
1(D1). Consider the
following cases:
1. The match happens before lj or after lj+1. A swap does not change the outcome.
2. The match happens in lj. If the match happens does not happen on w0
i, the swap
does not change the outcome. If the match happens on w0
i and w0
i+1 = 2 D2(j), the swap
leads to payoffs of v(lj+1) instead of v(lj). Otherwise, if w0
i+1 2 D2(j), the swap does not
change the outcome.
3. The match happens in lj+1. If the match does not happen on w0
i+1, the swap does not
change the outcome. If the match happens on w0
i+1 and w0
i+1 2 D2(j), the swap leads to
payoffs of v(lj+1) instead of v(lj). Otherwise, if w0
i+1 = lj+1(s2(D2)), the swap does not
change the outcome.
Therefore, u(s
"
1(D1);s
"
2)   u(s0
1(D1);s
"
2) = Pr(w0
i 2 lj(s
"
2(D2)) \ w0
i+1 = 2 lj(s
"
2(D2))) 
(v(lj)   v(lj+1))   Pr(w0
i+1 2 lj(s
"
2(D2)) \ w0
i = 2 lj(s
"
2(D2)))  (v(lj)   v(lj+1)). This
expression will be negative for some D1 2 D1 if and only if there exists a value of
max(1;i n+d)  j  max(i;d 1) such that Pr(w0
i 2 lj(s
"
2(D2))\w0
i+1 = 2 lj(s
"
2(D2))) <
Pr(w0
i+1 2 lj(s
"
2(D2)) \ w0
i = 2 lj(s
"
2(D2))).
PROPOSITION 3.13. Second-stage strategy proﬁle (";") cannot be a Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium for the second-stage of the ESP game for any Zipﬁan distribution over U
with s  1 and for any valuation function satisfying match-early preferences.
PROOF. From Lemma 3.12, it sufﬁces to show there exists 1  i  d such that
Pr(w0
i = 2 lj(s
"
2(D2)) \ w0
i+1 2 lj(s
"
2(D2))) > Pr(w0
i 2 lj(s
"
2(D2)) \ w0
i+1 = 2 lj(s
"
2(D2)))
for some max(1;i   n + d)  j  max(i;d   1). Consider D1 consisting of the d low-
est frequency words for player 2. We show that Pr(w0
d 1 = 2 ld 1(s
"
2(D2)) \ w0
d 2
ld 1(s
"
2(D2)))  Pr(w0
d 1 2 ld 1(s
"
2(D2)) \ w0
d = 2 ld 1(s
"
2(D2))). This is equiv-
alent to Pr(w0
d 1 2 ld 1(s2(D2)) \ w0
d = 2 D2) + Pr(w0
d 1 2 ld 1(s2(D2)) \ w0
d 2
ld(s2(D2))) < Pr(w0
d 2 ld 1(s2(D2)) \ w0
d 1 = 2 D2). Deﬁne A as the set of D2 that
satisfy: w0
d 1 2 ld 1(s2(D2)) \ w0
d = 2 D2. Deﬁne B as the set of D2 that satisfy:
w0
d 1 2 ld 1(s2(D2)) \ w0
d 2 ld(s2(D2)) and ﬁnally, deﬁne C as the set of D2 that sat-
isfy: w0
d 2 ld 1(s2(D2)) \ w0
d 1 = 2 D2. Construct t1 : A ! C that removes w0
d 1 from
A 2 A and replacing it with w0
d in CC. Since w0
d 1 and w0
d are adjacent in s2 and A and C
are non-empty, t1 is a bijection. Each A 2 A that occurs with probability pA is mapped
to a C 2 C that occurs with probability greater than pA 
f(w
0
d)
f(w0
d 1) (from Lemma A.1).
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Construct t2 that maps each B 2 B to a C 2 C, by removing w0
d 1 and replacing it with
w0
n. Therefore, each B 2 B that occurs with probability pB is mapped to a C 2 C that
occurs with probability greater than pA
f(w
0
n)
f(w0
d 1). Since w0
d 1 and w0
d are the n d+2 and
n d+1 most frequent elements in U, this gives us
Pr(A)
Pr(C) <
f(w
0
d 1)
f(w0
d) =
(n d+1)
s
(n d+2)s  n d+1
n d+2
and
Pr(B)
Pr(C) <
f(w
0
d 1)
f(w0
n) = 1
(n d+2)s  1
n d+2. Therefore,
Pr(A)
Pr(C)+
Pr(B)
Pr(C) < 1, which establishes
the desired result.
THEOREM 1.3. Second-stage strategy proﬁle (s
"
1;s
"
2) is a strict ex-post Nash equi-
librium for the second-stage of the ESP game for every distribution over U and every
e1 = e2, under rare-words preferences.
PROOF. Given s2 = s
"
2, we show that for any s1 6= s
"
1, player 1 (weakly) prefers s
"
1 to
s1 for all D1, D2 and player 1 strongly prefers s
"
1 to s1 for some D1, D2. Since s1 6= s
"
1,
there exists a D1 for which the sampled ordering: w0
1  w0
2  :::  w0
d, contains a pair of
adjacent w0
i  w0
i+1 with f(w0
i) > f(w0
i+1). Assume i is the smallest index that satisﬁes
this property. Consider the following cases:
1. The match occurs before li or after li+1. A swap does not change the outcome.
2. The match occurs at li. If the match happens on some w 6= w0
i, then f(w) < f(w0
i). If
w0
i+1 2 li(s
"
2(D2)) and f(w0
i+1) < f(w), then swapping w0
i and w0
i+1 leads to a strictly
better outcome. Otherwise, swapping does not change the outcome. If instead, the
match occurs on w0
i and w0
i+1 2 li(s
"
2(D2)), w0
i+1 is the word matched upon, which
is a strictly better outcome. If w0
i+1 = 2 li(s
"
2), w0
i is matched upon in li+1 and player 1 is
indifferent between the two outcomes.
3. The match occurs at li+1. If the match happens on some w 6= w0
i+1, then w 2
li+1(s2(D2)) and swapping w0
i and w0
i+1 does not change the outcome. If the match
happens on w0
i+1, swapping w0
i and w0
i+1 yields an outcome of matching on w0
i+1 in li,
but player 1 is indifferent between these two outcomes.
If s
"
2(D2) has w0
i+1 in position i, w0
i in position i + 1 and li(s1(D1)) \ li(s
"
2(D2)) = ;,
then player 1 strongly prefers s
"
1 to any other s1.
PROPOSITION 4.4. Second-stage strategy s
#
1 is strictly dominated for any second-
stage strategy of player 2 and for any distribution over U and any choice of effort levels
e1;e2, under rare-words preferences.
PROOF. We will exhibit a strategy that (weakly) dominates s
#
1 for any D1, D2 and s2
and strictly dominates s
#
1 for some D1, D2 and s2. Suppose s1 = s
#
1. Let w0
1 and w0
2 be the
two highest frequency words of player 1, with f(w0
1) > f(w0
2). Consider the following
cases:
1. The match happens after l2. Swapping w0
1 and w0
2 does not change the outcome.
2. The match happens on w0
1. Now suppose the match occurs in l1 and w0
2 = l2(s2(D2)),
swapping w0
1 and w0
2 leads to a strictly better outcome: w0
2 is matched upon instead of
w0
1. If the match occurs in l1 and w0
2 6= l2(s2(D2)), swapping w0
1 and w0
2 does not change
the outcome. If the match happens in l2, swapping w0
1 and w0
2 does not change the
outcome.
3. The match happens on w0
2 in l2. If w0
2 2 l1(s2(D2)), then swapping improves the
outcome, otherwise it does not.
LEMMA 4.10. There exists a solution to the second system of linear equations.
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PROOF. We deﬁne the candidate solution to the linear system of equations as fol-
lows: For all i;j, if D
j
H \ UL * Di
L, yij = 0.
Otherwise, (that is, D
j
H \ UL  Di
L),
yij =
PrUd
L(Di
L)
P
Dk
L:D
j
H\ULDk
L PrUd
L(Dk
L)
where PrUd
L(Di
L) = Pr(Di
L) denotes the probability of obtaining Di
L, when sampling
from the universe UL d times without replacement. (Most of the time the Ud
L notation
is implied, but for the purposes of this proof it is necessary for clarity).
It is easy to see from this deﬁnition of yij that 0  yij  1 for all i;j. Also note that, for
all j:
jDLj X
i=1
yij =
X
Dk
L:D
j
H\ULDk
L
Pr(Dk
L)
P
Dk0
L :D
j
H\ULDk0
L Pr(Dk
L)
= 1
Now it remains to show that the candidate yij satisﬁes equations of the second type.
Note that:
PrUd
L(Di
L)
P
Dk
L:D
j
H\ULDk
L PrUd
L(Dk
L)
=
Pr(D
j
H \ UL)Pr(Di
L n D
j
HjD
j
H \ UL)
P
Dk
L:D
j
H\ULDk
L Pr(D
j
H \ UL)Pr(Dk
L n D
j
HjD
j
H \ UL)
=
Pr(Di
L n D
j
HjD
j
H \ UL)
P
Dk
L:D
j
H\ULDk
L Pr(Dk
L n D
j
HjD
j
H \ UL)
=
Pr(ULnD
j
H)d a(Di
L n D
j
H)
P
Dk
LnD
j
H:D
j
H\ULDk
L Pr(ULnD
j
H)d a(Dk
L n D
j
H)
(11)
where a = jD
j
H \ ULj (e.g. the number of “low words” in D
j
H) and Pr(ULnD
j
H))d a(S)
denotes the probability of obtaining the set S from d a samples from the set UL nD
j
H,
where the sampling is done without replacement. Since the denominator of Eq. 7
equals 1, we get:
yij = Pr(ULnD
j
H)d a(Di
L n D
j
H) = Pr(UHnD
j
H)d a(Di
L n D
j
H)
where the last expression denotes the probability of obtaining Di
L n D
j
H when
sampling from UH n D
j
H until getting d   a low words (e.g. d   a words from UL). Now
going back to equations of the second type: PjDHj
j=1 Pr(D
j
H)yij =
PjDHj
j=1 PrUd
H(D
j
H)Pr(UHnD
j
H)d a(Di
L nD
j
H) = PrUd
L(Di
L) for all i.
LEMMA 4.11. If a solution to the second system of linear equations exists, then a so-
lution to the ﬁrst system of linear equations exists. Namely this solution can be obtained
by xij = yij 
Pr(DH;jjH)
Pr(DL;ijL) .
PROOF. Since a solution exists to the second system of linear equations, there exists
a set of yij that satisﬁes:
PjDHj
j=1 Pr(D
j
H)  yij = Pr(Di
L) 8i such that 1  i  jDLj, or
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PjDHj
j=1
Pr(D
j
H)
Pr(Di
L)  yij = 1 8i such that 1  i  jDLj. Observe that this gives a solution to
the ﬁrst type of equation in the ﬁrst linear system of equations, where xij = yij
Pr(D
j
H)
Pr(Di
L).
This same set of yij satisﬁes:
PjDLj
i=1 yij = 1 8j such that 1  j  jDHj. If yij = xij 
Pr(D
i
L)
Pr(D
j
H), then
PjDLj
i=1 xij 
Pr(D
i
L)
Pr(D
j
H) = 1 8j such that 1  j  jDHj, or
PjDLj
i=1 xij  Pr(Di
L) =
Pr(D
j
H) 8j such that 1  j  jDMj.
Finally, we need to show that if xij = yij 
Pr(D
j
H)
Pr(Di
L), then 0  xij  1. Note that yij = 0
when D
j
H \UL * Di
L, so xij = 0 when D
j
H \UL * Di
L. When D
j
H \UL  Di
L, 0 < yij  1.
Also note that when D
j
H \ UL  Di
L, D
j
H and Di
L have some k number of words in
common and the remaining d   k words in D
j
H are only “high” words. Therefore, the
remaining d   k words in D
j
H are all lower frequency words than the remaining d   k
words in Di
L. By repeatedly applying Lemma A.1, we get that Pr(D
j
H) < Pr(Di
L), and
therefore, 0  xij  1.
LEMMA 4.14. For every D1;L, where D1;L is a dictionary sampled with respect to
the L effort level, and for every g that satisﬁes the property that D1;L is mapped to a
dictionary in D1;H 2 DH such that D1;H \ UL  D1;L and when both players play
increasing frequency in the second stage and for all utility functions that satisfy rare-
words preferences and k 
Pr(wn k2DH)
Pr(wn k+12DH) for all k, we have that:
X
D2;H
Pr(D2;H)  u(s
"
1(g(D1;L));s
"
2(D2;H)) 
X
D2;H
Pr(D2;H)  u(s
"
1(D1;L);s
"
2(D2;H)) 8D1;L (12)
In addition, the inequality is strict when g(D1;L) 6= D1;L.
PROOF. Lemma 4.13 tells us that each DL is mapped to a DH that dominates it.
Therefore, it sufﬁces to show:
X
D2;H
Pr(D2;H)u(s
"
1(D0);s
"
2(D2;H)) 
X
D2;H
Pr(D2;H)u(s
"
1(D);s
"
2(D2;H))
for D0 = fw0
d;w0
d 1;:::;w0
1g and D = fwd;wd 1;:::;w1g (sorted in order of increasing
frequency), where w0
j = wj for all j 6= i and f(w0
i) < f(wi).
P
D2;H Pr(D2;H)u(s
"
1(D0);s
"
2(D2;H)) =
P1
j=d t0
j  v(wj), where t0
d = Pr(wd 2 D2;H), t0
d 1 =
Pr(wd = 2 D2;H \ wd 1 2 D2;H), ..., t0
1 = Pr(wd = 2 D2;H \ ::: \ w2 = 2 D2;H \ w1 2 D2;H)
Likewise
P
D2;H Pr(D2;H)u(s
"
1(D0);s
"
2(D2;H)) =
P1
j=d tj  v(wj) for analogous deﬁnition
of the tj’s. Since D and D0 differ in only the ith coordinate, t0
j = tj for all d  j  i + 1.
Therefore:
X
D2;H
Pr(D2;H)u(s
"
1(D0);s
"
2(D2;H))  
X
D2;H
Pr(D2;H)u(s
"
1(D);s
"
2(D2;H))
=
1 X
j=i
t0
j  v(wj)  
1 X
j=i
tj  v(wj)
t0
j > tj for all i   1  j  1, so t0
j  v(wj) > tj  v(wj) for all i   1  j  1 and therefore,
P1
j=i 1 t0
j  v(wj)  
P1
j=i 1 tj  v(wj) > 0.
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Finally it sufﬁces to show that t0
i v(w0
i)  ti v(wi). We know from the statement of the
theorem that
v(w
0
i)
v(wi) 
Pr(wi2DH)
Pr(w0
i2DH) = ti
t0
i, which gives us the desired result.
LEMMA 4.15. Given that players are playing words in order of increasing frequency,
X
D1;H
Pr(D1;HjH)
X
D2;H
Pr(D2;HjH)  u(s
"
1(D1;H);s
"
2(D2;H)) >
X
D1;L
Pr(D1;LjL)
X
D2;H
Pr(D2;HjH)  u(s
"
1(D1;H);s
"
2(D2;H)) (13)
for all u that satisfy rare-words preferences and k 
Pr(wn k2DH)
Pr(wn k+12DH) for all k.
PROOF. From Lemma 4.12, we know that:
X
D1;H
Pr(D1;HjH)
X
D2
Pr(D2;HjH)  u(s
"
1(D1;H);s
"
2(D2;H)) =
X
D1;L
[
X
D1;H
Pr(D1;HjH)Pr(g(D1;L) = D1;H)]
X
D2
Pr(D2;HjH)u(s
"
1(D1;H);s
"
2(D2;H))
This is equivalent to writing:
X
D1;H
Pr(D1;HjH)
X
D2;H
Pr(D2;HjH)  u(s
"
1(D1;H);s
"
2(D2;H))
=
X
D1;H
[
X
D1;L
Pr(D1;LjL)Pr(g(D1;L) = D1;H)
X
D2;H
Pr(D2;HjH)u(s
"
1(g(D1;L));s
"
2(D2;H))]
>
X
D1;H
[
X
D1;L
Pr(D1;LjL)Pr(g(D1;L) = D1;H)
X
D2;H
Pr(D2;HjH)u(s
"
1(D1;L);s
"
2(D2;H))]
=
X
D1;L
Pr(D1;LjH) 
X
D2;H
Pr(D2;HjH)  u(s
"
1(D1;L);s
"
2(D2;H))
where the inequality follows from Lemma 4.14.
PROPOSITION 4.18. There exists a distribution over U for which ((H;s1);(H;s2))
cannot be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the ESP game for any pair of consistent
second-stage strategies s1;s2 and for any utility function satisfying match-early prefer-
ences.
PROOF. We map each high dictionary to a set of low dictionaries, using the mapping
from Section 4. We use the following distribution over U, each low word is sampled with
probability 1 
jULj and each high word is sampled with probability 
jUHj jULj. Under this
distribution, the probability of sampling a dictionary consisting of low words only, is
greater than d!( 1 
jULj)d. The probability of sampling a dictionary that does not entirely
consist of low words is 1   (1   )d. Note that as  ! 0, d!  ( 1 
jULj)d ! d!  ( 1
jULj)d > 0 and
1 (1 )d ! 0. Thus there exists a value of  such that d!( 1 
jULj)d > 1 (1 )d. Since
the distribution described is uniform over the low effort words, if player 1 chooses L
effort, his second-stage strategy is given by s2, applied to the set of L words (from
Lemma 3.9).
It sufﬁces to show that:
P
D2 Pr(D2)I(lk(s2(h(D1;H)))\lk(s2(D2))) 
P
D2 Pr(D2)
I(lk(s2(D1;H)) \ lk(s2(D2)) for all k and all D1;H with the inequality strict for some
D1;H and some value of k. Under the mapping, each dictionary D1;H is mapped to
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all dictionaries D1;L that satisfy the property D1;H \ UL  D1;L. Consider the pre-
ﬁx lk(s2(D1;H)) and the preﬁx lk(s2(D1;L)) where D1;H is mapped to D1;L under
h. If lk(s2(D1;H)) 6= lk(s2(h(D1;H))), lk(s2(D1;H)) contains a set of high words
and/or it contains a set of low words. If it contains some low words that are not in
lk(s2(D1;L)), these words are in D1;L but are lower priority words than all of the
words in lk(s2(D1;L)). It sufﬁces to show
P
D2 Pr(D2)  I(lk(s2(D)) \ lk(s2(D2))  P
D2 Pr(D2)  I(lk(s2(D0)) \ lk(s2(D2)) for a pair of dictionaries D and D0 where
lk(s2(D0)) = lk(s2(D))   fwig + fwjg and either wi;wj 2 UL with wi  wj under
s2 or wi 2 UL and wj 2 UH. First we handle the case where wi;wj 2 UL with wi  wj
under s2. Since wi  wj under s2 and f(wi) = f(wj), Pr(wi 2 lk(s2(D2)) > Pr(wj 2
lk(s2(D2)), by Lemma 3.9. Therefore the desired inequality is satisﬁed for this case
and the inequality is strict. Now we handle the case where wi 2 UL and wj 2 UH.
Since wi is in the top k words of D, there exists at least one dictionary D2 with wi in
the top k words. This dictionary occurs with probability greater than any high effort
word occurs in a dictionary D2. Therefore the desired inequality is satisﬁed for this
case and the inequality is strict. Since there exists at least one value of D1;H such that
h(D1;H) 6= D1;H, there exists a value of k and D1;H such that the inequality is strict.
Therefore, playing (L;s2) is a strict ordinal best response to (H;s2).
LEMMA A.1. If dictionary D and dictionary D0 only differ by one element, xi and x0
i
respectively, with fe1(xi) < fe2(x0
i), then dictionary D0 is sampled with strictly greater
probability than dictionary D as long as e1  e2.
PROOF. If e1 > e2, Pr(D0je2) > Pr(D0je1). Therefore it sufﬁces to show this for
e1 = e2. A particular dictionary can be sampled in one of d! ways. Each permuta-
tion of D has a corresponding permutation of D0 that involves replacing xi with x0
i.
Let A = a1;:::;ad be a permutation of D and let A0 = a0
1;:::;a0
d be the correspond-
ing permutation of D0, where A and A0 differ in coordinate j. A is sampled with
probability Pr(a1)Pr(a2ja1):::Pr(adja1;a2;:::;ad 1) and A0 is sampled with probability
Pr(a0
1)Pr(a0
2ja0
1):::Pr(a0
dja0
1;a0
2;:::;a0
d 1). We know Pr(akja1;:::;ak 1) = Pr(a0
kja0
1;:::;a0
k 1)
for all k < j and Pr(akja1;:::;ak 1) < Pr(a0
kja0
1;:::;a0
k 1) for all k  j. Hence, for each
permutation of D, there exists a corresponding permutation of D0 that is sampled with
strictly greater probability and Pr(D0je1) > Pr(Dje1).
LEMMA A.2.
1 (1  1
nsZ )
d
1 (1  1
msZ )d  m
s
ns for all Z > 0 and all integers m;n;d such that m >
n  1 and d  1 and all s  1.
PROOF. It sufﬁces to show that the above statement holds for d = 1 and that
1 (1  1
nsZ )
d
1 (1  1
msZ )d <
1 (1  1
nsZ )
1 (1  1
msZ ). Observe that
1 (1  1
nsZ )
1 (1  1
msZ ) =
1
nsZ
1
msZ
= m
s
ns . Hence the statement
is true for d = 1.
Now consider
1 (1  1
nsZ )
d
1 (1  1
msZ )d
This expression is the same as
(1 (1  1
nsZ ))(1+(1  1
nsZ )+:::+(1  1
nsZ )
d 1)
(1 (1  1
msZ ))(1+(1  1
msZ )+:::+(1  1
msZ )d 1)
Since (1   1
nsZ) < (1   1
msZ), we have that
1+(1  1
nsZ )+:::+(1  1
nsZ )
d 1
1+(1  1
msZ )+:::+(1  1
msZ )d 1 < 1
1 (1  1
nsZ )
d
1 (1  1
msZ )d <
1 (1  1
nsZ )
1 (1  1
msZ ).
LEMMA A.3. For every pair of DH and DL such that DH \ UL  DL, when player
2 is playing L effort and both players play increasing frequency in the second stage, we
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have that:
X
D2
Pr(D2)  I(gw(s
"
1(DL);s
"
2(D2)) 2 fwn;:::;wn k+1g) 
X
D2
Pr(D2)  I(gw(s
"
1(DH);s
"
2(D2)) 2 fwn;:::;wn k+1g) 8k (14)
When DH \ DL = ;, this inequality is strict for all k.
PROOF. Since player 2 is playing L effort,
P
D2 Pr(D2)  I(gw(s
"
1(DL);s
"
2(D2)) 2
fwn;:::;wn k+1g) =
P
D2 Pr(D2)  I(gw(s
"
1(DH);s
"
2(D2)) 2 fwn;:::;wn k+1g) = 0 for
all 1  k  jUHj   jULj. Now consider jUHj   jULj  k  jUHj. Let A = DL \
fwjULj;wjULj 1;:::;wjULj k+1g and B = DH \ fwjULj;wjULj 1;:::;wjULj k+1g. Therefore:
P
D2 Pr(D2)I(gw(s
"
1(DL);s
"
2(D2)) 2 fwn;:::;wn k+1g) =
P
D2 Pr(D2)I(A\s
"
2(D2)) and
P
D2 Pr(D2)  I(gw(s
"
1(DH);s
"
2(D2)) 2 fwn;:::;wn k+1g) =
P
D2 Pr(D2)  I(B \ s
"
2(D2)).
Since DH \ UL  DL, B  A. Therefore, if I(B \ s
"
2(D2)) = 1, then I(A \ s
#
2(D2)) = 1,
for all D2 2 DL. Thus,
P
D2 Pr(D2)  I(A \ s
"
2(D2)) 
P
D2 Pr(D2)  I(B \ s
"
2(D2)). If
DH \ DL = ;, then there exists D2 2 DL such that A \ D2 6= ; and B \ D2 = ;.
Thus:
P
D2 Pr(D2)I(A\s
"
2(D2)) >
P
D2 Pr(D2)I(B \s
"
2(D2)), which gives the desired
result.
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